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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
fjrJJUlCPOV oib £7rlXczpcrv lrpiiyfJ-a blOpf(crJ()m, erAA' oujJfov bzaYWYT7V, i] av bzayofJ-cvOC;
EKaoTOr T7J.1wlJ AUOIT£A£OTaTT]1J SWT}IJ SePT]:
'Or do you suppose that you attempt to determine a small matter, and not the conduct of
life, by which each of us may live a most profitable life?'
(Socrates to Thrasymachus, Republic 344d7-e3)!
How are we to live? lrWC; jJZWrEOV; Implicit in the question, central to Greek
ethical thought, are at least two assumptions: (l) that not all ways ofliving are equally
conducive to making a good human life, and (2) that we have at least some agency in
creating that life. A good life, indeed the best life, is one that attains happiness
(cubmfJ-ovfa). As Aristotle writes, 'As to the name [ofthe highest good], it is agreed
nearly by everyone, for both the masses and the refined say that it is happiness, and
suppose that 'living well' and 'doing well' are the same as 'being happy' (HE 1095a17-
21). 2 But that is not the end of the inquiry, of course: Aristotle continues, 'but over
happiness, what it is, they wrangle' (HE 1095a21-22).
1 All translations are my own, unless otherwise indicated. Stephanus page numbers appearing without title
of the work refer to the Republic.
2 The highest good is that which is desired for its own sake, and for the sake of which other things are
desired (NE l094a19-23). Cf. Symposium 205a2-3: 'There is no further need to ask why [iva rf] one
wishes to be happy, as the answer seems to be final.' No further ground can be sought. It is important to
note that the Greek term admits of a somewhat wider application than the English 'happiness'; some
commentators prefer to render it 'human flourishing' or 'well-being.' I will use all three Engish terms as
the context warrants.
2Plato's Republic is, among a great deal of other things, a dramatic wrangling over
what kind of life secures the greatest happiness. In book one Thrasymachus colorfully
extols the life of supreme injustice as that which best serves one's own interests, and
hence guarantees the greatest happiness. The happy life is one in which one's desires can
be satisfied with the least restraint or limit. Thrasymachus' root position may
conveniently be reduced to the proposition that when it comes to the interest of the
individual, 'injustice is always more profitable.'3 Yet for all his bile and bluster, only one
counter-instance need be found to refute his claim. Such a counter-example would not be
hard to find. 4 But Plato is not simply stuffing some straw-man immoralist to topple. For
one counter-example would not show much; one could still aver that 'injustice is usually
more profitable,' or even more timorously that 'injustice is sometimes more profitable,'
and these approximate what Plato supposes many people surreptitiously think.
Accordingly he seeks not to show the contradictory, 'injustice is sometimes not more
profitable,' but the contrary, 'injustice is never more profitable,' or rather 'justice is
always more profitable,' which is a much stiffer proposition. And indeed he spends the
majority of the Republic in defense of this seemingly implausible claim. This should
alert us that Thrasymachus is not the only, or even the ultimate opponent, but rather the
3More profitable than justice, of course. Conversely stated, 6/lcalOC; av-r,p a6/lcov 7ravraxor] uarTOv {Xci, 'the
just man always fares worse than the unjust' (343d). Thrasymachus grants exceptions for petty injustices if
they are detected, but the grand injustices, presumably as manifestations of superior strength and cunning,
carry no such qualification. His early formulations ofjustice, couched in politial terms, which shift about as
Socrates comers him, are all informed by this more fundamental premise about the individual's good.
4 For instance, Herodotus' account (1.96-100) of Deioces, who exploits his reputation for delivering just
arbitration to create for himself a kingship among the Medes, to his own great advantage. Less exotically,
one can easily think of cases where refraining from injustice for the moment could heighten one's
advantage over the long run. The later reformulation of Thrasymachus' position by Glaucon will
accommodate these and similar cases.
3more prevalent, if less extravagant, moral ambivalence implicit in conventional thought.
For Plato's claim, that justice is always more profitable, is the denial of the conventional,
if largely unstated, view.
Now of course this claim of Plato's equally can be overturned by one counter-
example. Yet furnishing such a case is not as easy as might be imagined, if one grants
Plato's elaboration ofjustice as essentially linked to what we might call 'mental health.'5
No one, after all, wishes to fall ill, either in body or mind. Nevertheless, I shall argue that
such a counter-example seemingly may be found in the pages of Herodotus, in the tale of
Gyges the Lydian.
Whatever else it may be, Herodotus' story of Gyges is a reflection on the nature
of entangled commitments, moral deliberation, and human happiness. It presents an
account of how a reflectively self-interested moral agent might behave under duress,
might reluctantly acquiesce in an unjust act, along with an implicit justification for that
act. Though it may read more like Aeschylean tragedy than ethical case study, its core
impulse cleaves close to a conventional morality, that neither glorifies the immoralist, nor
mandates sainthood for moral approbation. In fact, Gyges will tum out to be rather like
an ordinary moral agent, not terribly unlike ourselves, who finds the circumstances that
frame his difficult choices largely beyond his control. In the end, Gyges appeals to a
familiar, if conflicting, set of moral considerations to navigate his dilemmas. But unlike
the outcome of our usual garden-variety choices, the unsought for result of his injustice is
5 Or 'psychic harmony', as Vlastos coins it, in which condition the soul is 'healthy, beautiful, and in the
ontologically correct, hierarchic, internal order.' (Vlastos 1971 a, 68-9). The soul, or ljIvXr" need not be
freighted with any religious or metaphysical baggage; as Annas (1981, 123-4) points out, it 'need commit
one to no more than talking about something as alive and functioning as a living thing.' The precise nature
and effect ofjustice, as presented in Republic book 4 will be discussed below.
4limitless wealth and power, of a luster undimmed to the end of his days. Can Plato really
deny, in terms that 'save the appearances' of our ordinary moral understanding, that
Gyges is not better off for his choice?
Now this is an unlikely counter-example, perhaps, but a counter-example
nonetheless. Moreover, I shall argue that on Plato's own account ofjustice in Republic 4,
Gyges appears to be better off for the act, though naturally Plato attempts to exclude such
a result. Here is Plato's quarry, then, this his more formidable adversary in his defense
ofjustice. As will be seen, if Plato can meet this challenge, he will have already
outmaneuvered the immoralist position ofThrasymachus, for this more extreme position
is largely parasitic upon implications nestled within the conventional view.
Yet is there any indication that Plato in fact gave Herodotus' Gyges any
consideration? Plato never explicitly mentions Herodotus' tale. There is, of course,
Plato's own story of Gyges in Republic 2, in which Gyges slays the Lydian king, and
takes the queen and kingdom as his own. But apart from this barest sketch, all else of
substance diverges: Gyges' position, his motives, his means, the structure and sympathy
of the tales bear little resemblance. Is it not rather more likely that the two authors
independently adapted a familiar folktale for their own purposes? After all, taken
together the pair has not drawn much attention, even from the lidless gaze of scholars.6
60nly three such studies that focus on the two Gyges more or less exclusively are known to me: Smith
(1902a and 1902b) attempts to reconstruct the common source of the two versions of the story that would
have been current in Classical Greece. Davis (2000) provides a loose and impressionistic reflection on
Herodotus' and Plato's critique of the tyrant's longing to collapse the distinctions of nomos and nature,
inside and outside, seeming and being. And Schubert (1997) reads Plato as answering a conception of
justice set forth by Herodotus (ultimately traceable to Solon), in particular the inevitability of retribution for
violating human limits and the legitimate ways to assume political power. None ofthese studies will be
considered in this paper, as their concerns and approaches are so far removed from this thesis that there are
few productive points of contact.
5Given the dearth of direct evidence, only an indirect case can be made. I shall
endeavor to demonstrate how productive, how pregnant a reading of Herodotus' tale is
for Plato's Gyges and the unfolding account of a just moral agent in the Republic. Plato
disentangles tensions and implications latent in Herodotus' Gyges as he faces his moral
dilemmas, showing in book one the ways in which ordinary moral agents can go wrong,
and the hazards of leaving conventional thinking unexamined. The traditional, one might
say 'tragic,' ethical perspective, while it provides a rich vernacular in which to articulate
suffering and loss, does little to help adjudicate the opposing sides of moral conflicts.
But the Socratic elenchus can only take us so far; it may confront us with our own
confusion, but it cannot redirect us toward the Good. We too, as reflective subjects, must
be properly conditioned, so that we are receptive to reason's insight. Only thus can we
reliably perceive where our interest truly lies, where our happiness. Plato would say that
Herodotus' Gyges makes the mistake of believing that it is better, at least in his case, to
do than to suffer injustice, and so he vitiates his own happiness. Through such mistakes
we unwittingly may forsake our happiness; only through the study of philosophy and the
correctly attuned character of the just moral agent, Plato argues, can we correctly choose
the best ends, and thus reliably secure our happiness.
Even so, in the end we will discover that Plato's account cannot meet Herodotus'
Gyges' challenge. His account ofjustice and his agent-centered ethics cannot exclude the
possibility that he was indeed happier by his unjust action. Why this is so will be
explored in detail. The paper closes with a consideration of how significant an exception
this may be, what options are available to Plato to contend with this, and whether it
threatens the entire project of the Republic.
A brief discussion of two critical choices in this thesis should be aired at the
outset. First, given the thorny problems surrounding the validity of referencing one
Platonic dialogue in support of a position in another, wherever possible I have based my
textual claims on the Republic alone, citing other dialogues only as corroborative
6
evidence, or where a point is expressly made that is implicit in the Republic. Second, in
presenting Plato's arguments I shall shear some arguments of unnecessary elements that
might cloud the argument, or involve us in tangential scholarly squabbles whose
mediation this paper need not be concerned. In a work whose aims are as diverse and
diffuse as the Republic, Plato's attempts to link tightly all the parts together often lead to
strain and confusion, if not outright fallacy. It is all too easy to dismiss the heart of an
argument if the limbs are poorly articulated. Accordingly, I will not consider Plato's
political arguments, either for the ideal state or for suggesting analogies with individuals
or souls with respect to virtue.7 This is not to deny that they have any philosophical
interest, but they are inessential to making the best case for justice in the individual,
which is our central concern.
7 Plato would have done well here to learn from his pupil Aristotle, whose notion of 'focal meaning' (see
Wilson 2000, 116 ff.) would have disabused Plato from the mistaken notion that 'just' means exactly the
same thing in all its instances, that the property applies isomorphically to all entities in which it inheres.
This is simply mistaken. To take one of Aristotle's favorite examples, the tenn 'medical' does not mean
the same thing when applied to a patient, a function, and an instrument, but they are related to some one
thing (Metaphysics Z.4, 1030a28-b3). This does not itself invalidate the theory of Fonns, of course; Plato
must simply allow for the lack ofunivocality oftenns, and assign Fonns not to words but to kinds:
wherever there is a kind, all members of that kind share some nature that make them be of that kind.
7CHAPTER II
o FORTUNA: CHANCE AND CHOICE FOR HERODOTUS' GYGES
7rQv E(rri Civ8pOJ7roC; fJvj.upopf}.
The whole of man is but chance.
(Solon to Croesus, Histories 1.32)
The account of Gyges is Herodotus' first vivid historical vignette, is recounted
after briefly introducing Croesus, Gyges' descendent on whom retribution falls for
Gyges' own injustice. Their stories bear many thematic and structural affinities (best left
to a study of its own), yet relevant here is that each present a compressed case study of
how a person's mistaken beliefs can lead to seismic consequences for his or her material
circumstances and, it is assumed, happiness. But unlike 'tragic error,'8 such mistakes are
not bound by an internal logic that yields only negative consequences. For Gyges and
Croesus both err, but while for the latter this leads to the loss of his cherished son, for the
former it marks a meteoric rise in fortune. 9 This variance underscores one of Herodotus'
ubiquitous themes, the transitory nature of human happiness. After introducing Croesus,
Herodotus continues,
I shall go forward in my narrative, equally going over the small and the great
cities of men. Cities that formerly were great, most of them have become
insignificant, and those that were great in my time were once small. Knowing
therefore, that human happiness [euow,uovf1Jv] never remains in the same place, I
shall make mention of both equally (Histories, 1.5).
8 On which see Shennan, and p. 27 infra.
9 Croesus errs-and provokes retribution [vt,ue07~]-in supposing himself to the most happy of all men
[av8pW7rwv crn:avrwv oAj31WTarov], on account of his fantastic wealth (Hist. 1.34).
8The role this instability of happiness plays in an ethical framework that might loosely be
called 'tragic' will be considered after we have followed Gyges in his navigation between
his moral dilemmas, all the way to the throne of Lydia.
Gyges" First Dilemma
Kal Ope~ j.101 t50KECl J](vt5apo~ 7wrfj(Jal vOj.1ov 7ravrwv jJamAEa qJT7(Ja~ clVal.
Now Pindar seems to me to have poeticized correctly in saying that custom is king of all.
(Herodotus, Histories, II1.38)
This Candaules, then, fell in love with his own wife, and since he fell in love he
believed that his wife was by far more beautiful than all others. And inasmuch as
he believed these things, Candaules praised beyond measure the beauty of his
wife to Gyges, son of Dascylus, the favorite of his bodyguard; to this Gyges he
entrusted even the most important affairs. After not much time had passed, for it
was fated that Candaules come to ill, he said to Gyges such things as follows:
'Gyges, I do not suppose that you believe me when I speak about the beauty of
my wife (for the ears happen to be less trustworthy than the eyes for men);l0 bring
it about that you shall see her naked.' But Gyges, crying aloud, said: 'Master,
what word-insane [0 UK ltyzia] word-are you saying, commanding me to behold
my mistress naked! Together with her tunic a woman also removes her
respectability [ait5c3]' Long ago, the things that are right [reX KaAO] 11 for men
were discovered. from which one must learn-among these there is this one: that
one look after one's own [a"K07rEC1V TlveX reX tavrou]. 1 am convinced that your
wife is of all most beautiful, and I ask of you not to ask what is unlawful
[civoj.1wV].' And so speaking he was resisting such things, fearing lest some evil
should happen to him from them (Histories, 1.8-9).
10 Cf. Heraclitus fro lOla, &pBaJp,ai yap rwv Wrcov itKpz(JirJTcpoZ fJaprvpcc;, 'for eyes are more accurate
witnesses than eyes.'
11 Godley (1931) translates as 'wise rules,' Sheets (1993) glosses as 'fine principles'; Rawlinson more
loosely renders the sentence as 'Our fathers, in time past, distinguished right and wrong plainly enough,
and it is our wisdom to submit to be taught by them.' Long (1987, 25) considers this same sentence 'a
beautiful epigrammic defmition of what a Greek, or perhaps even a Lydian, would have defined as custom.'
Kcl6c; came to have moral overtones (from the original meaning of 'beautiful, fme'), especially when
opposed to alaxp6c; ('shameful'); this opposition is hinted at with the preceding alt5w (which can mean
'shame'). See Dover (1974,69-73) for a fuller discussion of the word.
9Before considering this first dilemma, a preliminary point must be addressed. It
may be thought that the whole affair lies under the shadow of necessity, that the actions
and decisions now unfolding are in some way determined: for it was fated that
Candaules come to ill [xpJ1v yap KaV~aUATJ yeVE(J()az 7<a1<~]. The argument might run
that if Candaules must fall, then he could not but act in the way that he does here act, and
that Gyges himself must react in ways consistent with this doom. Otherwise Candaules
would escape his fate. If this is the case, then the episode can hardly offer insight into
moral deliberation and choice, contrary to the premise of this paper.
One might counter that Herodotus introduces the account as an etiological
narrative. Given the (independently known)12 fact that with Candaules the Lydian
dynastic rule of the Heraclidae gave way to the Mermnadae (of which Gyges was the
first), this story merely fleshes out what we already know, with historical hindsight, had
to happen: namely, that Candaules and his line would fall. But surely this is too tepid a
reading of 'fated.'13 But we may accept a more full-bodied notion of fate without
sacrificing human agency (and without, one may add, getting embroiled here in sticky
philosophical issues). That Candaules was fated to come to a bad end in no way entails
that this has to be his end, in just the way it here happens. The agents involved could
have acted differently, with different ends issuing. Candaules' bad end would then have
12 From historical sources, including Persian inscriptions (Flory 1987,31).
13 Cf. Aristotle, de Interpretatione 9, who lays out the difficulties that would follow a reading of events in
this way.
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been met in some other way. The point is that, given the way in which Herodotus
articulates this fate, we are not forced to deny the moral agency of the actors. 14
Now the general nature of this first dilemma15 is fairly pedestrian, common to a
good deal of moral decision-making, even if the circumstances that couch it are not.
Gyges is faced with two competing commitments that have claim on him: on the one
hand, he is bound by law to obey the command of his lord, while on the other, he is
bound by principle ('that one look to one's own', one ofTa KaAa) not to do what the king
bid him dO. 16
Now these competing claims are both related to vo/-we;, which covers the English
equivalents of' law' and 'custom.' This ambiguity might strike the modem ear as a bit
slippery, and conducive to false opposition: surely what is enjoined by law has greater
claim on us than what is merely conventional; the violation of the former is criminal, that
ofthe latter is simply rude. But that assessment would overlook the degree to which the
underlying justification of law is rooted in custom, in a deeply-held communal sense of
14 One might rejoin that, though Herodotus' general statement ofCandaules' fate does not entail that this
series of events must lead to his downfall, nevertheless, since Herodotus introduces the clause with the
particle yap 'for it was fated... ', a strongly causal sense must be attributed to what follows: since it was
thus fated, Candaules said such things. But, while this is a possible reading, it cannot be assumed in any
non-question-begging way. One might also expect Herodotus to have signaled this with oUrc3~,'in this
way,' if this were his intended sense.
15 'A moral dilemma is a situation in which an agent S morally ought to do A and morally ought to do B but
cannot do both, either because B is just not-doing-A or because some contingent feature of the world
prevents doing both.' (Gowans 1987,3) The Kantian overtones to this formulation need not trouble us;
Greek tragedy's power is largely predicated upon some understanding, however expressed, of such
competing and exclusive claims.
16 More precisely, the transgression asked of Gyges is two-fold: (1) looking on another man's wife in a
way that only the husband is permitted to do; and (2) treating the queen in a manner inconsistent with the
dignity of her office. Both aspects hover around the idea of shame and respect (aibc3~). Cf. Williams
(1993, 82): 'Even if shame and its motivations always involve in some way or another an idea of a gaze of
another, it is important that for many of its operations the imagined gaze of an imagined other will do.'
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what is right.!? Nor is this simply a Greek phenomenon. To some degree, our modern
laws are justified ultimately by our societal understanding ofjustice and fairness; when
our understanding of these concepts shifts (as they did, say, regarding racial segregation),
our laws eventually are amended to reflect these beliefs. Now while we may not want to
push this correlation too far, for a Greek the connection between custom and law was
more intimate still.!8 What is important here is that Gyges himself considers the violation
of this custom, codified in the principle of 'looking to one's own,' to be avofl0C;, or
'unlawful.' So either way he is left committing an antinomian act: either he must
disobey his liege, or violate a binding moral principle.
Gyges reacts as any reasonable person might when asked by a superior to do
something morally shocking: he cries out in dismay. His first reaction is horror. The
prevailing view among modern commentators is that Gyges is thereby betraying a weak,
cravenly nature.!9 I believe that such characterizations are inattentive to, and inconsistent
17See Guthrie (1971, chapter 4): 'The [sense of 'custom'] was the earlier use, but was never lost sight of,
so that for the Greeks law, however much it might be formulated in writing and enforced by authority,
remained dependent upon custom or habit.' (56) Cf. Aristotle (Politics l269a20): 'For the law holds no
force with respect to being obeyed apart from custom [TO geo<;], and custom does not come about but
through much time, so that rashly changing from existing laws to different ones in common makes weak
the power of the law.' So also Havelock (1978, 24): '[Nomoi as a] body of maxims (as they become when
incorporated in contrived statements) represents the common consciousness of the group, its sense of what
is fitting, decorous, and seemly.. .It reflects the permanent properties of a society, over against which the
particular dicisions of a governing body have to be framed.'
18 'For a Greek the equivocation was hard to avoid, since the same word expressed both ideas and the
greater part of Greek law was in fact customary, not statutory. Hence the distinction between what is
legally enforceable and what is morally right was much less clear-cut among the Greeks than it is with us'
(Dodds 1959,266).
19For example, Flory (1987, 37) characterizes Gyges as 'not only cowardly, foolish, and clumsy,...he is also
remarkably passive'. So also Chiasson (2003, 22), and Long (1987, 19-20) judges him 'a largely passive
figure,' and 'an instrument and not an agent in the story.' It is easy to see how commentators may consider
Gyges a mere cipher, preferring either to psychoanalyze Candaules' idiosyncrasies, or marvel at the
masterful cunning and control of Candaules' wife.
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with, Herodotus' purpose, to the extent that this may be ascertained. This will become
clearer in the course of our discussion. Now Aristotle, for one, would likely consider this
not a cowardly impulse, but the proper affective response of one trained from childhood
in how to react to relevantly similar moral situations?O Parallels may also be drawn to
such figures as Agamemnon who, when confronted with his own baneful choice, along
with his brother 'smote the ground with their staves and stifled not their tears.'21 Surely
few would wish to call Agamemnon, on the eve of his expedition to Troy, a coward.
Once Gyges recovers sufficiently from his alarm, he earnestly endeavors to
dissuade his master from this apparent folly by appealing to the long-held 'things that are
right.' Again, this is exactly how we would expect a reasonable moral agent to proceed,
given his disadvantageous circumstances. It is interesting to note two points here. First,
Gyges seems to recognize that his choices are not necessarily exhaustive: ifhe can
persuade Candaules not to order this of him, he may dissolve the dilemma.22 In
attempting reasoned persuasion, effected by an appeal to commonly held beliefs, Gyges
shows himself a more complex figure than simply'a servant begging with his master.' 23
Second, Gyges seems to recognize that Candaules is not quite himself, that his command
is 'unhealthy' [oUK UyIEa]. Though he will not go so far as to challenge Candaules here,
20 'Wherefore it is necessary to have been brought up, right from early youth, as Plato says, so as to make
us take delight and to be pained in the things we ought, for this is the correct education' (NE 1104b 11-14).
21Aeschylus' Agamemnon, 201-02, trans. H.W. Smith.
22 Cf. 327c, where Polemarchus playfully enjoins Socrates to either 'prove himself stronger than these
men, or stay there,' to which Socrates replies in characteristic fashion, 'Is there still left this alternative: if
we persuade you that you must let us go?'
23 As Long (1987, 19) would have it.
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he hopes to show him that by his better lights he ought not ask such things.24 In short,
Gyges has shown himself to be neither unscrupulous opportunist nor hedonistic voyeur.
Herodotus has thus far carefully crafted Gyges' persona in a way that might be expected
to elicit sympathy from the reader.
Yet Gyges' appeal to principle does not fully express his reason for not wanting to
do what the king demands. Initially, it is true, he reacts viscerally to the suggestion that
he violate a deeply-held moral principle,25 as experienced through the immediate moral
perception of wrong. Nevertheless he is moved also by considering the consequences of
such action. We learn this not from Gyges himself but from Herodotus as narrator: 'and
so speaking he was resisting such things, fearing lest some evil should come to him from
them' (my emphasis). This may seem more like an aside than an integral part of the
narrative. But this is the fulcrum upon which Gyges' decision turns. As we shall see, it
is consequence, not principle, that proves sufficient to motivate his action.
That this is the case may be seen from Candaules' response. He does not
challenge Gyges on matters of principle; rather, he rightly perceives where the unspoken
yet crucial resistance lies: 'Be of good courage, Gyges, and fear neither me, as if I say
this to make trial of you, nor my wife, that some harm may come to you from her.'
Candaules then proceeds to contrive (;t17XavTj(J0JWl) the means by which Gyges may
24 If Gyges had reflected a moment here, he may have wondered whether he is duty-bound to obey every
command of his lord, even if it (or he) proves unsound. Cf. 331c, where it is agreed that one should not
return a lent weapon to one who has fallen mad, as a counter-example to the general premise that one
should return what is owed.
25 We must, of course, allow for the possibility that this moral principle is merely an articulated prohibition
ofa primeval taboo of the culture (Herodotus later hints at this: 'among the Lydians and nearly all of the
barbarians, even for a man to be seen naked bears great shame' Hist. 1.11), and that Gyges' visceral
reaction is thus to the suggestion of violating the taboo, not the principle. Be that as it may, it is to the
principle that Gyges appeals, as grounds for justification, when attempting to dissuade the king.
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observe the queen naked without being detected,z6 He would station Gyges behind the
open door of the bedchamber, whence he would be able watch the queen strip offher
garments piece by piece, placing them on an adjacent chair. Then, when she turns to go
to the bed, Gyges is to slip silently from the room. Candaules is suggesting that if the
consequences of the action may be averted, then much ofthe prohibitive force against
doing that action is removed.
Herodotus continues, 'Now as he was not able to escape, he was ready
[hoij,WC;].,27 It is important to note that Gyges has not been persuaded that the proposed
action is not wrong, but merely acquiesces in its execution. His situation is as follows:
either disobey the king, and suffer the (unstated but no doubt inevitable) consequences
thereof, or submit to the king's command, and act contrary to what is right, and yet~if
Candaules' plan works~escape any adverse consequences. Most moral agents, by this
26 Candaules seems to be implying that without such a ruse, Gyges would indeed suffer consequences from
the queen, thereby hinting at her formidable character. Schubert (1997, 256-57) observes, in connection
with the Gyges account in Plato, that 'chez Herodote, Ie recit tourne egalement autour l'idee d'invisibilite.'
It is true that invisibility is intended to afford escape from detection in both tales. But there is little to be
derived from this fact: for Plato, invisibility reveals Gyges' own true beliefs and desires; for Herodotus, it
is not Gyges' but Candaules' desires that are at issue; Gyges has clearly indicated that he would rather have
nothing to do with the whole affair. Nothing follows if Gyges had escaped detection (which he did, in fact,
the second time hiding behind the door); anyway it would have been a much less interesting story, since it
would not have led to the second dilemma, which is by far the more important.
27 This word gave me pause, since it often signifies 'active, zealous', or 'bold.' These seem rather out of
line with Gyges' reticence a moment ago. But a parallel may be drawn again with Aeschylus' Agamemnon
(though perhaps it is not as snug a fit for Gyges' mindset), after his initial anguish: 'But when he donned
the yoke of Necessity, with veering of spirit, impious, unholy, unsanctified, from that hour his purpose
shifted to resolve that deed of uttermost audacity. For mankind is emboldened by wretched delusion,
counselor of ill, primal source of woe. So then he hardened his heart to sacrifice his daughter. ..'
Agamemnon 217-24 (trans. H.W. Smith). On this passage Lesky (1966, 82) writes 'It might seem a
rationally acceptable solution to assume that once Agamemnon has surrendered to the necessity, forces are
unleashed in him that make him passionately seek to fulfill his aim. But I wonder whether we should not
be reading too much modern psychology into Aeschylus. It seems to me more correct simply to state this
union of external coercion and personal readiness, the meaning of this genuinely Aeschylean union is that
in this way man, acting out of necessity, has to take upon himself guilt and the need for atonement under
the divine order.'
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simple calculus of ends, would choose as Gyges does. He would be better off
committing than suffering wrong.28
Lest one object that it was fear, not calculation of consequences, that determined
Gyges' choice, let us consider what this would mean. Fear ofwhat?--ofwhat is to come
to pass if some course of action, or a different one, be followed. It is doubtful that fear
even makes any sense without reference to the future. So while perhaps it need not be
calculative, it must nevertheless concern itself with consequences. And while calculation
my not have provided the initial impetus, it does provide justification if one is concerned
primarily with outcomes. Now it is a tricky business, seeing all ends of actions. As
Gyges is about to discover, sometimes things happen that weren't foreseen.
Gyges' Second Dilemma
Candaules did not waste any time executing his plan. That night, he stationed
Gyges behind the door of the royal bedchamber, and events unfolded as anticipated: the
queen carne in, disrobed piece by piece, placing her garments on the chair, and from
behind the door Gyges beheld her.29 Then, as she turned to go to the bed, Gyges slipped
from the chamber. But-the queen caught sight of Gyges exiting the room. Immediately
she understood all. She did not cry out, nor let drop any indication that she was aware of
what had just transpired. Rather she plotted, 'having in mind to make Candaules pay.'
28 That Gyges would suffer wrong were he to disobey the king is clear, for disregarding an unjust command
(assuming that it is unjust) does not carry culpability, and so his punishment would be unwarranted.
29 We are not told whether Gyges believed the king's report of her beauty once his own eyes had put it to
the test.
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The next day, after making arrangements with her most trusted servants, she called Gyges
to her.
And he, supposing that she knew nothing of what had been done, came when
called. For he was accustomed, even before, to visit the queen whenever she
would call. And when Gyges came, the lady spoke these words: 'Now with these
two paths before you, Gyges, I give you the choice, whichever one you choose to
betake yourself to: either, having killed Candaules, take both me and the throne
of Lydia, or you yourself must die on the spot, in order that you may not obey
Candaules in the future in all points, and see what you ought not see. But truly
either that man, who devised these things must be slain, or you, who committed
improper acts by having beheld me naked.' And for a while Gyges wondered
greatly at these words, but afterward besought her not to bind him to the necessity
of making such a choice. Now as he failed to persuade her, and as he saw the
necessity truly having been placed before him-either to kill his lord or himself
be killed by others-he chose himse1fto survive (Hist. I.11).
This dilemma is beautiful in its symmetry, and fearful in its cruelty. Either
Candaules or Gyges must die, and it is for Gyges to decide-now. Never mind
proportionality of consequence to crime. Note, further, that there is no appeal to
principle or VOJlOC;, no possible confusion over law or convention. The details are pruned
to their bitter minimum. And here the morality and consequences of action are perfectly
contraposed: either do wrong and thereby gain everything (life, a queen, and kingdom),
or suffer wrong and thereby lose everything, including one's very life.
There is no avoiding this dilemma: the queen has servants at hand to kill him
right then and there, should he refuse to kill his king. 3D Nor will she be dissuaded.
Herodotus makes it clear, as narrator, that Gyges is truly (aA118fwC;) bound by necessity,
30 We are told nothing about their choices to collaborate in regicide, perhaps (to read into things a bit)
because they recognize no moral claim to counter blind obedience. At any rate, their complicity is
expedient for the plot, since the queen alone likely would be unable to compel Gyges under the yoke of
necessity.
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and repeats the nature of the dilemma-to kill or be killed-four times (all in 1.11-12).31
Though Gyges chooses his own survival (7fapzelVaz), it is a choice made unwillingly (OUK:
tBEAovm). He takes no delight in the prospect of gaining an apparent boon inconceivable
to the normal bodyguard-to rise far above one's rank to assume a queen and realm.32
The climax of the story is devastating, revealing the terrible brilliance of the
queen:
Then Gyges asked her, saying, 'Since you compel me to kill my master against
my will, come, let me hear in what manner we shall set upon him.' And she
replied, 'The attack will be from the same place whence that man exhibited me
naked, and while he is sleeping.' When they had made ready the plot, and night
had fallen (for Gyges was not let off, nor was there any escape for him, but it had
to be that either he or Candaules perish), he followed the lady to the bedroom.
And she, giving him a dagger, conceals him behind the same door. After this,
while Candaules was sleeping, Gyges slipped out and slew him, and thus Gyges
obtained both his wife and scepter (Hist. 1. 11-12).
What benefit would there be to Gyges sacrificing himself for a king who has
proven his judgment, if not his character, to be flawed, not to mention Herodotus' hint
that Candaules had oflate been neglecting his duties as sovereign? Moreover, once
Gyges assumes the throne, he proves himself a shrewd politician in averting an
impending civil war, while at the same time garnering support (and tacit justification)
from Delphi itself, on which Gyges lavishes offerings in return.33 It is true that the Pythia
31 Chiasson (2003, 37) disputes this reading of the dilemma, preferring rather to cast it as 'between the
honor of noble self-sacrifice and the dishonor of betraying the fealty he owes his master.' While these well
may be viable undercurrents, they are surely secondary considerations, as such a reading would sap the
story of much of its poignancy. It ignores Herodotus' repeated sign-posting of the necessity of killing or
being killed; clearly Herodotus thinks (this is his narrative), that those other factors are not primary.
32 The downside, presumably, would be to be married to Candaules' wife.
33 'He [Gyges] obtained the throne and was confnmed by the oracle of Delphi. For when the Lydians were
indignant at the misfortune ofCandaules and took up arms, both the partisans ofGyges and the rest of the
Lydians came to an agreement; that if the oracle ordains him to be king of the Lydians, then he will reign
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declares that his line will pay for this usurpation in the fifth generation, but Gyges
himself does not suffer retribution for this, nor will his descendents down through his
great-great grandson; and even ifhis great-great-great grandson is to lose the throne, is
this not in any event better than five generations of spear-bearers? It seems
uncontroversial to claim that Gyges would be better off choosing to kill Candaules rather
than be killed.
Does Herodotus condone this conclusion? Though not explicitly stated in the
text, support may be derived from Gyges' constant portrayal as loyal, trustworthy, and
earnestly desiring to do the right thing-despite eventually being driven to be disloyal,
untrustworthy, and complicit in wrongdoing. This reversal of behavior comes only as the
unwelcome issue of dire necessity. Again, he does not exhibit overweening pride or
ambition, faults rife throughout Herodotus' Histories, for which traits the possessors
personally suffer retribution, whether divine or otherwise. He becomes a tyrant, it is true
(in the sense of having obtained power through extra-constitutional means), but
Herodotus prefers to linger rather over his munificent gifts to Delphi, suggesting
righteous (if not fully exculpatory) recompense. He is, in his moral reactions and
deliberations at least, a conscientious, ordinary human being. Still, by choosing his own
self-interest-no matter how u~ust the resulting actions may have been-he emerges not
a hired spear but a fantastically wealthy man, not a servant, but a king. Was this not to
his advantage? And was he not justified in so acting?
and be king, but ifnot, then straightaway he will give back the rule to the Heracleidae [the house of
Candaules]. In fact the oracle did so declare and Gyges became king. To such an extent, however, the
Pythia said that vengeance will come for the Heracleidae in the fifth generation from Gyges...And Gyges,
having become tyrant, sent back not a few dedicatory offerings to Delphi' (Hist. I.l3-14).
----------- . --------- ._--
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CHAPTER III
HERODOTUS AND THE 'TRAGIC' VIEW OF HUMAN FLOURISHING
(J1(OTc£lV 6£XPTl 7raVTa; XPT7/laroc; TT7v Tdc:vrTlv 1(6 CxTCo!JT7(Jeral . TCO),Ao/m yap 6Tl
lnrOMc;lC; OA!JOV 6 Bea; TCpOppf(ovc; avtrpelfle.
But one must look to the end of each matter, to see in what way it will turn out; for
heaven, having given a glimpse of happiness to many, rips them up root and branch.
(Solon to Croesus, Herodotus' Histories, 1.32)
Let us widen the lens a little, and peer behind Gyges' dilemmas, briefly to
consider Herodotus as storyteller. For this story is not that of a dusty annalist; it has the
rhythm and immediacy rather of a folktale. 34 What sources could possibly reveal such
intimate exchanges in the royal bedchamber-was it the foot of some court chronicler,
lurking under Candaules' bed, that tripped Gyges in his stealth? No, history here is not
opposed to fiction, but informed by it, shaped most of all by all the angular gestures of
tragic poetry. But more than providing a repertoire of stylistic tricks with which to
peddle his tales, tragedy provides Herodotus an underlying worldview of the vulnerability
of human happiness to forces outside our control.
Nearly sixty years ago, a fragment of papyrus was recovered from oblivion,
delivered from the sands of Egypt. On it the scholar E. Lobel found sixteen lines from a
34A commonly observed trait of the tale, e.g. Flory (1987, 32), Cohen (2004,55), Griffm (2006, 46),
Griffiths (2006, 140). Herodotus usually laces his more properly historical narratives with sources and first-
person markers. (Chiasson 2003,24) The few ofthese we get (1.12, 14) confirm little more than Gyges'
existence and his copious offerings.
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lost tragedy, apparently recounting the very tale of Gyges we have been considering. 35
Scholars first thought that they had found the unknown source for Herodotus' tale, but
the prevalent opinion now holds that it is much later, and that in fact it relies heavily upon
Herodotus' account (Griffin 2006,50). Either way it is a tangible point of connection
between Herodotus's text and the tragic corpus.
All tragedians have a penchant for dire moral choices, of such a nature as to
provoke fear and pity-and their ensuing catharsis-in the audience.36 It is to the work
of Aeschylus, however, that Herodotus bears the closest resemblance. 3? For distinctly
Aeschylean are the motifs of choice between two evils under external compulsion, and
the step-by-step portrayal of the internal struggle of the protagonist in arriving at his or
35 The lines, following the translation ofD.L. Page, are as follows (the wife ofCandaules is speaking):
'[When] I saw clearly, not by guess, that it was Gyges, I was afraid ofa plot for murder in the palace; for
such are the wages of a monarch's state. But when I saw that Candaules was still awake, I knew what had
been done and what man had done it. Yet as if ignorant, despite the turmoil in my heart I bridled in silence
my dishonor's cry, to be unheard. My night was endless for want of sleep, as in my bed to and fro I turned
in anxious thought. And when the brilliant star that brings the dawn arose, forerunner of the first gleam of
day, 1roused Candaules from bed and sent him forth to deliver law to his people: Persuasion's tale was
ready on my lips, the one that forbids a King, the guardian of his people, to sleep the whole night through.
And summoners [have gone to call] Gyges to my presence... ' (Raubitschek 1955,48). For an excellent
study ofthis fragment, see Travis (2000).
36 Nussbaum (1986,25) says of tragedy that it 'shows good people doing bad things, things otherwise
repugnant to their ethical character and commitments, because of circumstances whose origin does not lie
with them.' In order to arouse pity and fear, Aristotle says, 'the change of fortune presented must not
be...that of a bad man passing from adversity to prosperity: for nothing can be more alien to the spirit of
tragedy.. .it neither satisfies the moral sense nor calls forth pity or fear...Fear [is inspired] by the misfortune
of a man like ourselves...There remains, then, the character...of a man who is not eminently good and just,
yet whose misfortune is brought about not by vice or depravity, but by some error or frailty' (Poetics
1452b34- 1453al 0, Butcher trans.). Butcher cautions that this must be read with 1448al -4 and 1454aI6-17,
which make it clear that the protagonist is not merely ofmediocre character: 'while [this character] has its
basis it reality, it transcends it by a certain moral elevation' (1911, 317). These passages, incidentally,
corroborate the view that Ggyes' character is not basely craven (assuming one accepts the tragic outlines of
the Gyges tale), but of a basically good moral fabric.
37 This is not to deny other, non-tragic influences; Homer also looms large in the pages of Herodotus. Even
in our tale, the alternation between direct speech and narration is more homeric than tragic. Yet these are
not ultimately so divergent. As Griffm remarks (2006, 46), 'tragedy itself is the daughter of homeric epic.'
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her choice.38 Chiasson is surely right-at least with respect to the story of Gyges-to
mark Herodotus' departure from his tragic model in attributing the source of that external
compulsion; like Socrates bringing philosophy down from heaven, so Herodotus brings
down necessity from divine to human agency.39 There is no oracle, no divine command,
which constitutes one of the lemmata of Gyges cruces; on both sides there is naught but
flesh and bone, human desires and motives.40
Structurally our Gyges story follows a tragic pattern of a succession of episodes,
ascending in emotional intensity and dramatic import, leading up to a culminating act of
violence, which is reported rather than dramatized. The first dilemma of Gyges, to either
disobey his lord or treat his queen contemptibly, is surely far more innocuous than the
second. Our earlier discussion focused on the ethical dimension of this dilemma, since
for Gyges at least, this was a grave matter. But from a different point of view, Herodotus
is almost winking at us here, making compulsory for Gyges what many men fantasize
doing, viz., peeping on a beautiful woman yVj)-VT]v. Even more amusing is Gyges reaction
38 Chiasson (2003, 22) discerns Aeschylean attributes to the Gyges tale. Lesky (1966, 80) notes that
Aeschyus 'elaborates the psychological development of the characters more fully than his successors'; he
fmds a two-stage process of (1) recognition and (2) decision, where (2) does not quickly or easily follow
(1). He acknowledges his debt to Snell, who 'emphatically placed the personal decision of the human agent
at the center of his interpretation of Aeschylus.' (78)
39 As Cicero says of Socrates in his Tusculan Disputations (V.iv.l 0). Thus also Chiasson (2003, 23):
'Herodotus distances himself from the world of Aeschylean tragedy by emphasizing human rather than
divine causation, in keeping with his announced topic of events with human origins (ra yev6,ueva E(
av8pWrcwv). Herodotus does not completely eliminate the element of superhuman causation from his
story, since he acknowledges at the outset that Candaules "was bound to come to a bad end"...nonetheless,
and whatever the precise meaning of this phrase may be, Herodotus' focus remains on the human actors
and factors in this story, especially in his representation of Gyges' decision to kill or be killed.' This is not
an uncontroversial point, though I believe it is substantially correct.
40 Griffin (2006, 54-56) compares the account of the battle of Salamis in Aeschylus' Persae with
Herodotus' Histories, fmding that while the former is sleek, streamlined to convey the core message: 'the
divine led Xerxis into his arrogant venture; it deceived him; and it planned his ruin,' Herodotus is much
messier, teeming with the complexities true to life, engaging more human and natural causes (like the
geography around Salamis) for Xerxes' fall, than divine direction.
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of horror, as ethically correct as it may be. One gets the sense that, in this first dilemma,
Herodotus is consciously playing with his tragic model, and letting us in on the joke. But
more importantly, the touches of levity with which Herodotus accents this first dilemma
suggests that Gyges should have re±1ected more on the nature of his situation: perhaps its
necessity was not so severe as he thought, perhaps he was too hasty in abandoning his
protestation of the king's request. Now what would have resulted from Gyges refusing
Candaules' command? In truth, probably nothing terrible would have happened, barring
some unforeseen outburst of royal rage. Most likely Gyges would have fallen into
disgrace at the palace and have lost some of his privilege. At any event, whatever the
consequences, they would almost certainly have been less dire than finding himself in the
second dilemma, which is no laughing matter.
The shift in tone from one dilemma to the next is reflected in the language of
Herodotus. 'I ask of you not to ask of me what is av0J10C;, contrary to what is right,' said
Gyges in the first dilemma, as though these opposing V0J10l were a veritable Scylla and
Charybdis. But this seems mere piffle and smoke, compared to the grim necessity about
to bind him. Stupefied that next morning by the queen's words-that he must commit
either murder or suicide- at length Gyges 'as a suppliant begged [the queen] not to bind
him to the necessity of deciding such a choice as this.' And as if we had not adequately
apprehended the desperation of the situation, Herodotus repeats, 'as he was seeing the
necessity truly having been placed before him, either to kill his lord or himself be killed
by others.' Herodotus' language, as narrator, now mirrors Gyges own reported words,
reinforcing that it is not merely that Gygesfeels this necessity, but that it truly obtains.
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Then, with the emotional intensity fully charged, Herodotus delivers Gyges'
decision in a phrase so startlingly understated that it catches the reader's breath: 'he
chose to survive [neple /Val].' The terms of the dilemma-kill or be killed-have been so
driven into the reader's mind, that, in choosing mere survival, Gyges choice is blunted to
one that is eminently understandable, even if the means of survival are pernicious. This
apparent reasonableness continues in Gyges further showing himself unwilling to take the
initiative in performing the deed. The queen must devise the plan-this is her revenge-
and Gyges simply performs his required part. Many commentators consider this
passivity;41 if so it is one which betrays his desires as still contrary to the exigencies of
his situation. But more telling against Gyges' ultimate passivity is the fact that Gyges
chose (aIpkTat): this crucial word Herodotus holds off until the last possible moment.
Choice entails rational assent, an agency which accepts responsibility for what follows.
41 See n. 19, supra.
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Voluntary Action and Responsibility
No one willingly does anything wrong.
(Plato, Protagoras 345d)
Yet the modem reader may wonder whether assent under duress can truly be
called voluntary, and whether culpability attaches to compulsory actions. After all,
Herodotus harps on the real necessity (avayKo,,[ryv a),ry8twC;) binding Gyges. Is the
compulsion of so great a force as to vitiate choice? Would we consider that one who
suffers the travail of torture willingly does what is asked of him or her? And if we grant
that in this case one does not act voluntarily, is not Gyges' case, where he faces not pain
but death, even less voluntary? Now even if we insist that the action is in some way
voluntary, would not the necessity remove the stain of culpability from the compelled
act? These questions is pertinent to our inquiry because only actions that are voluntary
demonstrate the agency required to make them ethically relevant,42 So if Gyges' actions
turn out to be involuntary, then treating his situation as though it has ethical import
apparently would be mistaken.
Now what would make an action involuntary? Generally speaking, actions are
involuntary if they are done either under compulsion or through ignorance.43 Yet this
does not itself say much, as both of these criteria admit of different glosses such that the
same action may be either voluntary or involuntary, depending on which interpretation
one follows. Compulsion is, strictly speaking, the application a force which lies entirely
42 As Aristotle says, 'Virtue is concerned with emotions [n-aB!l] and actions, and praise and blame arise for
voluntary actions, but for involuntary actions condonation, and sometimes pity... ' (NE II09b30-33).
43 This analysis follows Aristotle's distinction at NE II 09b3 5ff.
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outside the agent, as when a sailor forcibly is carried off by a storm or by pirates. Clearly
Gyges does not face this sort of compulsion. His coercion was imposed rather by an
exclusive disjunction, wherein he was constrained to do either A or B, but the choice
rested with him. In each of his dilemmas he chose according to which he thought offered
the better consequences, or at least avoided the worse evi1.44 Now given this choice,
however limited, it would seem that Gyges' actions are at least to that extent voluntary.
Indeed, seen from a different angle, had Gyges plead, 'he made me look at her naked,' or,
'she made me kill him,' few would grant that these excuses sufficiently capture Gyges'
own role in his actions. It would appear, then, that Gyges cannot claim that his actions
were involuntary due to compulsion.
But could Gyges plead that ignorance, the other source of involuntary action, led
him to act involuntarily? This does not seem relevant to the second dilemma, where the
clarity of its horns was essential to its staggering power. What about the first dilemma?
There are three ways in which we may understand Gyges to have acted through
ignorance, to have erred, in the first dilemma. It is worth noting that each mistake,
though perhaps relatively insignificant in itself, precipitates the next, and ultimately lands
him before queen's crux. First, he should have given less weight to the king's command,
understanding that the duty to obey his lord may not, in certain conditions, be binding;
this enabled the dilemma to emerge in the first place. Second, on the other side of the
44 Aristotle addresses kinds of case similar to Gyges: 'But such actions as are done on account of fear of
greater evils ...whether they are involuntary [GKouma] or voluntary [bwuma], is a topic of dispute...Acts
such as these are 'mixed' [ullcrai], but more like voluntary ones. For they are chosen at the very time when
they are done...and the origin of these acts is in the agent himself. Such actions, then, are voluntary, though
perhaps involuntary when considered absolutely [cmAWc;], since no one would choose any action ofthis sort
in itself' (NE 111 Oa4-20).
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dilemma, Gyges demonstrated an insufficient grasp of the significance of his moral
principle 'looking to one's own;' he could (correctly) appeal to principle, with which he
could expect Candaules to agree, but once the king did not acknowledge this claim, he
was unable to defend it in any serious way. This in turn led to the swift railroading of
his objections when the ground shifted from principle to consequence. Finally, Gyges
inadequately perceived the consequences of his alternatives; minimally, he overestimated
the consequences of disobeying the king, and underestimated the consequences of
. h 45crossmg t e queen.
Now would any of these mistakes be sufficient to claim ignorance, and thus
render his action involuntary? The most he can claim is that his first two mistakes follow
from an incomplete or unclear grasp of what is morally salient or morally required. As
such, they have much in common with wrongdoing in general, and so cannot be excused
on this ground.46 The kind of ignorance that makes an action involuntary is one wherein
the agent is ignorant of the particular circumstances in which the action is made (NE
llllal-2).47 Since Gyges clearly doesn't demonstrate this kind of ignorance, he cannot
eschew the inherently voluntary, and hence culpable, nature of his decision.
45To some degree, of course, all human endeavor is blind to the ultimate outcome of our actions. But
unless we are willing to thereby call all action involuntary, Gyges cannot claim ignorance for this reason.
Plato might add that Gyges failed to see how the consequences related to his overall good.
46 His mistake was not as glaring as 'I didn't know that X was wrong,' which of course is no excuse at all.
(Cf. the modem view that ignorance of the law no excuse for a crime.) Aristotle likewise asserts that
ignorance right and wrong, or of one's true interests does not qualifY as involuntary (NE IIIOb28-1111 al).
47 For example, imagine running to the aid of an elderly woman screaming that she is being mugged. You
tackle the mugger, and the woman escapes unscathed into the crowd; it turns out, however, that she was the
one who robbed the man at gunpoint. Clearly you were ignorant of the circumstances, and thus (on
Aristotle's notion) involuntarily aided a thief.
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Yet granted that his actions are voluntary, do not the dire circumstances in which
he made them warrant understanding, even pity, and mitigated culpability? After all,
Gyges surely would not have chosen to do these things if not under coercive duress.
Certainly there are cases that most people would recognize as deserving leniency.48 Now
whether or not Gyges' second dilemma qualifies as an action of this type is an open
question. It is doubtful that any sharp distinctions can be made a priori by which to
separate cleanly those actions that deserve leniency from those that do not. However that
may be, the way in which Herodotus presents the tale suggests that he, at least, would
likely consider Gyges to merit some pardon.
We have expended some effort to understand the degree to which Gyges' exhibits
true agency, with all that that entails, because the way our actions, our choices-even our
mistakes-relate to our overall well-being is of fundamental concern. Both Herodotus
and Plato reflect on this question in light of their shared tragic tradition. Herodotus is an
observer of man's foolishness and man's fall, or their contraries, but links happiness only
loosely to choice. Plato, as we shall see, will claim a far more robust role for choice in
the success or failure of our lives as a whole. Both views entail consequences for how we
should conduct our lives.
48 As Aristotle says, 'when someone does something he ought not do, on account of such things as strain
human nature to the limit, and no one could abide,' these may be met with leniency ((jvyyvw/lT/) (NE
lI1Oa23-26). It should be noted that this view of mitigated responsibility is at odds with that presented in
tragedy. Indeed, the poignancy of the tragic situation depends on the belief that the agent bears full
responsibility for an action imposed by some necessity: 'If one makes a clear logical distinction, of course,
one will say: 'a man who acts under necessity is not acting voluntarily.' But to insist on logical
consistency would mean that we should have to reject considerable parts of Aeschylus' tragedies, for many
of the tragic situations he presents do, in fact, spring from the rationally indivisible fusion of necessity and
personal will' (Lesky 1966, 82).
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The tragic patrimony bequeathed to Herodotus and Plato presents a world of
darkly obscure forces, where men and women, driven beneath the yoke of necessity,
labor to satisfy a divine mandate; but by the very act of carrying it out may be
perpetrating criminal, if not morally outrageous, deeds for which they are nonetheless
responsible.49 We have already examined how Herodotus preserves this dynamic of
constrained choice while confining it largely to the human realm. Much of what drives a
tragic narrative is what befalls a human being, what happens to us that falls outside our
control. Such 7raBf]jJ.ara, 'things suffered,' often are seen to undermine rational control
of our own well-being.
Yet an equally important inheritance is the role of opaprfu or 'error.'50 Aristotle,
in his discussion of tragedy, makes it clear that reversals of fortune must not be entirely
capricious: '[the proper tragic character] falls into misfortune, not on account of
wickedness or depravity, but on account of some error [61' CxjJ.aprfuv Tlva]' (Poetics
1453a8-10). Here again Herodotus displays a mindfulness ofhis tragic trope, and
embodies it rather in an anti-tragic hero: Gyges, for all his hand wringing and CxjJ.aprfaz,
emerges not covered in ashes but wreathed in gold.
What are we to make of all of this? Specifically, may we distill some view of
human happiness from the variegated mass ofHerodotus' history, of which the Gyges
tale is emblematic?
49 So Lesky (1966, 85) notes '[the same act] can be the fulfilment of duty, obedience to a divine order, and
yet at the same time be a dreadful crime.'
50 As Sherman remarks (1992, 177-78), 'what engages us most as tragic spectators is not simply...what
befalls the protagonist...Rather, it is how the tragic figure contributes to her own misfortunes. Even where
the action is performed under duress as the result of an external conflict, agency (or causal responsibility) is
still implicated.'
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Herodotus' Heraclitean Happiness
EKclvO 7rpCYrov /laBc, ~ KUKAOe; rwv avBpw7rr;(wv EOT! 7rpr;Y/lCr:rwv, 7rcPUpcpo/lcVOe; dE oUK
Eel aic! roue; aUrou;- cUrVXEclV.
Learn this first and foremost: just like a wheel are the affairs of men, and whorling
around it does not suffer the same men to be ever fortunate.
(Croesus to Cyrus, Herodotus' Histories, 1.207)
The most salient feature of Herodotus' happiness is its transience. His statement
at 1.5, quoted on page 7, where he observes that 'human happiness never stays in the
same place,' is played out in countless variations throughout his sprawling work. 51
Perhaps Herodotus would mouth the mantra attributed to Heraclitus-7ravm pc ~
'everything flows'-but pare its scope from ontological principle to inductive synopsis of
the panorama of human fortunes. Moreover, as the tale of Gyges shows us, such
reversals bear no necessary connection with how skillfully one navigates life's difficult
choices. 52 But happiness is not completely untethered from our choices and actions; it is
just determined largely by other factors.
Happiness lacks stability because the components of which it is comprised are
equally unstable. Not surprisingly, Herodotus does not give us a convenient catalogue of
51 See also the introductory quotes to chapters two and three. Cf. VII.45-47: Xerxes, viewing his vast army
and fleet, fIrst declared himself happy, but then wept when he considered the shortness of human life, that
none of those amassed before him would be alive in a hundred years. Artabanus, his uncle and advisor,
replied, 'Other things, more pitiable than this, we have suffered in the course oflife. For in a life as short
as ours, no man is by nature so happy, either among those here or others, for whom not once but many
times it has come into his head to wish himself dead rather than alive. For with disasters falling upon us
and illnesses harassing us, even this brief life they make seem long.'
52 Save the glaring exception for lJjJpl(;;, or over-weening pride, as exhibited in, e.g., Croesus and (most
notably) Xerxes. This fault of striving to exalt oneself beyond the natural limits afforded human being is
reliably followed by a fall.
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all and only those factors that contribute to happiness. In the passage at 1.5 we get a
vague connection between greatness and happiness: cities great and small equally will
be surveyed, Herodotus tells us, since human happiness never stays in the same place.
But what makes a city, or an individual, great? Certainly KAEOC;, or 'glory,' is relevant.
This thoroughly Homeric value emerges right at the beginning of the Histories.
Herodotus has set forth his work 'in order that neither the deeds wrought by men be
effaced through the passage of time, nor works, great and wondrous, those displayed both
by Greeks and barbarians, be without fame [dxAea]' (Hist. 1.1). Works and deeds-
actions, then-are among the things that bring honor. But we have seen that actions are
fraught with uncertainty, and choices that bring action are darkened with potential error.
More than that, though, glory is emptily evaluative, it does not itself specify the actions
and choices that warrant it. So we are left facing the same question: what constitutes
happiness?
While Herodotus does not give us an answer in the story of Gyges, he does the
next best thing. Recall that when Delphi confirmed Gyges as king, it was foretold that
the fifth descendent from Gyges would pay for his usurpation.53 Now Croesus was this
descendent, and in the course of his story the reader is privy to a conversation between
him and the sage Solon on this very subject. Croesus' own story, like Gyges', has many
affinities with tragedy; they both err, they both undergo spectacular reversals, but
Croesus looses the very things Gyges gained: seemingly limitless wealth and power, and
very nearly his life. This inverted equipollence rounds out the arc of men's fortunes, here
53 See n. 33, supra.
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traced small what cities and empires inscribe on broader parchment. Croesus' discussion
of happiness at his apogee renders his fall all the more powerful, and is a testament to
Herodotus' deft control of his material. 54
Upon arriving at Croesus' palace, we are told, Solon was duly entertained and
given an extensive tour of the royal treasury's splendors. 55 Croesus, eager to hear
confirmation of his superb grandeur from such an illustrious guest, later asked Solon
whether he were not the happiest man (oAfJzcJraror:;) he had ever seen. Before moving to
Solon's response, let us be clear as to what Croesus is asking. The Greek ofJzor:;, like
euba./J1OJv, can be used both of one's external prosperity and of what we might call true
happiness. One may wonder whether this whole query is not predicated upon Croesus'
conflation of these two senses. But two things tell against this reading. First, though
Croesus does seem to think that wealth is (the greatest part of) happiness, and that to the
degree that one has wealth one has happiness; nevertheless, it is clear that he is not asking
simply whether he is the wealthiest man Solon has ever seen. If this were all he was
asking, then he would have asked an accountant, not a sage. What Croesus is looking for
is a judgment, not a balance sheet. Second, as we shall see, Solon understands Croesus'
question to be, at heart, about the nature of happiness, and he answers accordingly.
Croesus will reject his answer, but he will give no indication that he thinks Solon
misunderstood the question.
54 This dynamic is repeated in book one of the Republic, where Socrates converses with Cephalus and his
son Polemarchus, while they yet live in wealth and comfort. The reader knows that shortly thereafter this
family would face utter ruin, their wealth plundered and Polemarchus executed.
55 The full narrative is found at Hist. 1.30-33. There is general scholarly consensus that this entire episode is
fabricated by Herodotus, and does not necessarily reflect the position of the historical Solon.
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To return to the story, Solon replied by giving one, then another, case of men he
considered happier than Croesus. No doubt he could have continued in this fashion had
the king not impetuously cut him off, waxing wroth in his tarnished glory. The
particulars of these cases are not as important (for our purposes) as the kinds oflaudable
attribute they express. As a set, they are thoroughly conventional: birth in an illustrious
city, into a respected (if not noble) family, the good repute of the individuals themselves,
and possessed of sufficient wealth;56 if they reach a ripe age, flourishing offspring; but
most crucially, perishing in a manner worthy of memory long after their passing. These
goods do not necessarily provide an exhaustive list of the components of happiness.
Solon later adds comeliness and a life free from deformity and disease. He grants that it
is unlikely that one person will possess all components, whatever they are, at the same
time, but suggests that a certain aggregate can prove sufficient for happiness, if and only
if one can preserve them to the very end his or her life (Hist. 1.32).57
Solon's view of the components of happiness, then, is retentive. But it is clear
that these factors depend, to a significant degree, upon the vicissitudes of fortune, and so
to that extent lay outside our control. If one possesses these things at some point in his or
her life, by Solon's lights one is merely fortunate; somewhat paradoxically, one can only
56 At least enough resources to meet one's daily needs. Solon does grant some benefit to wealth. The
wealthy man may more easily satisfy his desires, and he is able to bear calamity more easily. (His!. 1.32)
But he considers these of less substance than good fortune, since wealth (as Croesus' own case will show)
is a paltry salve in severe misfortune.
57 Curiously virtue is not listed among the goods that make life happy. It is unclear how much may be
inferred from this. The list, as mentioned, is not exhaustive; virtue likely would factor in somewhere here,
but presumably in a subsidiary manner. Certainly the historical Solon would have deemed it relevant. 'In
order to promote the interests of the [Athenian] polis, Solon criticized the greed and injustice of both rich
and poor, and he urged that self-restraint and fair-mindedness were central virtues of a political life in
common' (Balot 2001,79). Nor should we infer that Herodotus despised it; see Havelock (1978,296-307).
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be called happy from the very moment of death. Aristotle considers, and rejects, this
very position attributed to Solon, calling it JrQVTcAw.;- aroJrov, 'altogether strange' (NE
1099b 13). Yet the considerations by which Solon arrives at this bizarre conclusion are
not so exotic. After calculating the limit of a man's life to be twenty-six thousand two
hundred fifty days, he drives home his point: 'Each of these days is entirely different in
what it brings; thus, 0 Croesus, is the whole of man but chance' (Hist. 1.32). This is not
to say that there is no continuity in our lives, but that whatever we strive to cultivate in
our lives-whether wealth, or honor, or anything else of the sort mentioned above-hang
perpetually under the inscrutable shadow of fortune.
Does this view, put in the mouth of Solon, reflect Herodotus' own perspective? It
has long been assumed that this episode is programmatic for the Histories as a whole. 58
Herodotus provides no less than eighteen passages in which the transience of fortune, and
hence happiness, is either stated or implied. 59 There is no reason to doubt, moreover, that
the plurality of goods which comprise this happiness (however transient) are considered
by Herodotus to be worthy components of the good life. And by this account, we may
infer that to Herodotus, Gyges was not only fortunate, but happy; for he carried the boon
won at Candaules' expense to the end of his life. These goods are not, we might note, all
that different from those esteemed by our own conventional values. In fact, the basic
architecture of this happiness has newly been buttressed by a defense of its underlying
58 Shapiro (1996, 348) gives a partial bibliography for 'the many adherents of this view.' Shapiro herself
will renew the defense ofthis reading against recent challenges.
59 Ibid., 357. Shapiro further argues that the mechanism behind this ephemerality, which Solon says is
divine jealously, is also attributable to Herodotus. But this further claim is not without controversy; all
that is needed for our purposes is the view that the stability the goods that contribute to happiness is prone
to forces external to our control, whether of divine origin or not.
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supports. While Herodotus' Gyges offers a counter-example to Plato's defense ofjustice,
this newcomer defends this counter-example's assumptions about the human condition,
directly challenging Plato's conception of the flourishing human life in the Republic.
The Fragility of Goodness: Nussbaum's Challenge
Hwc:er cwom mearg? Hwc:er cwom mago?
Hwc:er cwom maNJUmgyja?
Hwc:er cwom symbla gesetu? Hwc:er sindon seledreamas?
Eala beorht bune! Eala byrnwiga!
Eala peodnes prym! Hu seo prag gewat,
genap under nihthelm swa heo no wc:ere.
Her biD jeoh lc:ene, her biD freond lc:ene,
her biD mon lc:ene, her biD mc:eg lc:ene.
Eal pis eorpan gesteal idel weorpeD.
Where has the horse gone? Where the kinsman? Where has the treasure-giver gone?
Where the places of banquet? Where are the hall pleasures? 0 bright cup! 0 the mailed
warrior! 0 the glory of princes! How that time has passed away, grown dark under the
cover of night as if it had never been.
Here is loaned wealth, here is loaned friend, here is loaned man, here is loaned kinsman;
all this foundation of earth becomes desolate.
(anonymous Old English elegy The Wanderer, 11. 92-96, 108-110)
Martha Nussbaum's work, The Fragility ojGoodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek
Tragedy and Philosophy, crafts a thoughtful and compelling defense of what we have
called the 'tragic' perspective. The basic tenet of her position is that the vulnerability of
happiness is one of the features that make it distinctly, and beautifully, human
(Nussbaum 1986,2).60 Any attempt to sequester happiness from its inherent insecurity is
6°1 cannot do detailed justice to Nussbaum's powerful book here; only those general features that dovetail
with the tragic and Herodotean view, and the broad strokes of her trenchant critique of Plato (especially the
Republic) will be considered. This corresponds to the first five chapters of Fragility.
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bound to sacrifice many of what we consider worthwhile components of the good life. A
corollary to this is that the components, the values, that comprise human happiness form
an irreducible plurality. And as we saw in previous sections, the things we value are
prone to shifts in luck, that is, to what happens to us (7[a.8TjIla.ru) rather than what is of our
Nussbaum presents her account as faithful to the way our intuitive practical
reasoning functions when we consider how to live our lives (lO)Y For the Greek, as for
our vernacular understanding, of the good life, no subset of values can be granted even a
prima facie priority. In particular, she claims that assuming moral values have priority
over non-moral ones, is not only dissonant with the Greek way of apprehending the
matter, but also prejudices the inquiry in a question-begging way (4-6, 28_30).62 Both
kinds of value contribute essentially to our overall well-being, weaving a rich tableau of
interests and commitments. It follows that acting morally, preserving certain moral
61 She designates her approach as roughly Aristotelian: 'ethical theorizing proceeds by way of a reflective
dialogue between the intuitions and beliefs of the interlocutor, or reader, and a series of complex ethical
conceptions, presented for exploration.' This method has considerable overlap with Socrates' elenchus,
with which he investigated the beliefs of his fellows. Nussbaum, pace Aristotle, adds that this theorizing
can only be responsive to those who already hold certain values and commitments.
62 Nussbaum is here thinking primarily of the Kantian approach, for which only moral values are relevant in
our choices. She gives two reasons for her own distrust of dividing conflicts into moral and non-moral
instances: (1) it is rarely clear what is meant when a conflict is labeled 'moral,' as there is no agreement as
to what this distinction amounts to; (2) even if (1) is granted, the categories ofmoral and non-moral do not
divide neatly or cleanly (28-29). This second point is particularly weak, as borderline cases do not
invalidate distinctions (this fallacy is rife in contemporary critical theory): the fact that I can't tell exactly
where orange separates from red or yellow does not mean that there is no valid distinction between orange,
red, and yellow. As to the fIrst point, the fact that there is disagreement on what 'moral' means, that is,
what makes a moral conflict moral, does not mean that there is not signifIcant agreement on what cases
qualify as 'moral,' whatever that may mean. Nussbaum seems to be suggesting that intensional
disagreement entails extensional disagreement (which is false), or that extensional agreement yields
nothing of signifIcance. Yet from the set of agreed cases much can be inferred, however provisionally.
Even ifher reasons seem wanting, that does not mean that her broader point is not justifIable on other
grounds.
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values, does not necessarily enhance well-being, since this depends not only on moral,
but also on non-moral, values. If I act in accordance with my moral values, but thereby
forfeit a host of goods reflecting non-moral values, this may actually decrease my overall
well-being.63 The fundamental parity of value clarifies how, on this view, Gyges may be
justified in acquiescing in slaying Candaules, and reaping the rewards.64 In the totality of
values he holds, some are moral, others non-moral; he acts in a way to preserve that
subset which (in his assessment of consequences) will contribute most to his overall well-
being.
If there is no intrinsic hierarchy to one's values, then it is clear that there will be
conflicts in which one will have to choose among competing interests, where they cannot
be simultaneously satisfied. Inevitably, then, such dilemmas will bring loss and even
regret, regardless of one's choice, since in choosing one interest another is sacrificed
(27).65 And if one's happiness is tied to such values, then it follows that some loss of
63 Now the range of particular values, and the goods which are their objects, can also be articulated in terms
of interest. The goods I pursue will reflect how I conceive my interests, on the assumption that my
interests (as expression of my values) contribute to my happiness. As we shall see, the Greeks understood
moral considerations as frequently opposed to one's true interests, and serving as an irksome, if socially
useful, check on pursuit of one's personal advantage.
64 It is doubtful that Nussbaum would wish to admit this, but it appears that her account cannot exclude this
possibility. Now the lack of priority among values does not entail that we desire all goods exactly the same.
Our particular circumstances, history, and disposition make for different gravitational pulls toward different
objects of value; but in themselves there is no essential variation of value.
65 Chapter 2 explores several conflicts from tragedy that follow along these lines. One of the most
promising strands that Nussbaum develops is the role of the emotions in navigating difficult circumstances.
She advocates considering ethical concerns through tragedy, because 'our cognitive activity...centrally
involves emotional response. We discover what we think about these events partly by noticing how we
feel; our investigation of our emotional geography is a major part ofour search for self-knowledge' (15).
Nussbaum goes on to castigate Plato for severing the intellect completely from the other human faculties
(see especially chapters four and five). But here she is far too impatient to fit Plato into her predetermined
plan; for, as will become clear, Plato does not seek to revile or repress emotive responses, but rather to
harmonize them with an understanding of one's true interests.
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happiness is unavoidable. Until fairly recently the philosophical tradition generally has
not welcomed such dilemmas, however frequently they may crop up in life and literature,
constructing procedures to reduce or eliminate them wherever possible.66 The basic
impulse that resists such dilemmas can be summarized (albeit crudely) by the dictum
'ought implies can:' if the moral agent faces two equally-weighted (moral) claims, both
of which one ought to do, but both of which cannot be done, then it cannot be that they
both ought to be done.67 The tragic worldview not only embraces such conflicts as
inherent to our choices, but further, by implication, it denies that reason can disentangle
our values in such a way that it consistently preserves what we value without loss.
This gets to the heart of Nussbaum's challenge. One of the basic claims of her
book is that Plato, in pointed reaction to the tragic tradition, attempts to render the happy
life se?fsufficient, that is, impervious to the assaults of fortune, through the appropriate
exercise ofreason.68 It is not difficult to anticipate Nussbaum's central objections to this
project, based on what has gone before: rational self-sufficiency is illusory since so
many of our commitments and values are bound up with what lies outside of our control.
66 Generally speaking philosophers only worry about conficts of belief, not attitude. See Gowans (1987, 4
ff.) for a discussion of how moral theories have historically dealt with moral dilemmas. One common way
to eliminate them is monism, wherein a 'theory attempts to reduce moral considerations to a single
dimension [e.g. utility] and thereby attempts to eliminate all apparent moral conflicts' (10).
67 Cf. Plato's Euthyphro, where an account of 'the pious' is rejected on the basis of such a conflict (7a ff.):
if the pious is simply 'what the gods love,' then, since different gods may love different things, one and the
same thing may be thus rendered both pious and impious, and this (Socrates concludes) is absurd.
68 'Nothing has emerged more clearly for me during my work on this book than the importance of viewing
Plato's thought, in particular, as a response to this [tragic] complex cultural tradition, motivated by its
problems and preoccupations' (13). And more specifically, 'The need ofhuman beings for philosophy is,
for [Plato], deeply connected with their exposure to luck; the elimination of this exposure is the primary
task of the philosophical art as he conceives it' (90). This position, Nussbaum contends, Plato defends
through the middle dialogues, including the Republic; but will be revised in his later dialogues to admit to
the good life elements that are intrinsically fragile. Our concern is limited to Plato of the Republic.
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And giving up all those contingent goods would leave a life that is hardly happy, let alone
human. It would seem that husking happiness of its risky elements to leave a hard kernel
of invulnerability would yield a result akin to Eos' request that Tithonus, her human
lover, be granted immortality: she forgot to ask in addition that he be ageless, so over
time he slipped ever further into deathless dotage, until he could not even move his limbs,
and was eventually laid out in a room where immobile, he babbles on endlessly to
himself (Hymn to Aphrodite, 218-38). Would anyone be willing to pay such a price for a
life without risk of death? Would anyone, by the same token, really consider such a
meager happiness worthwhile?
Furthermore, Plato's project does not adequately reflect our complex nature as
human beings. Our rationality only accounts for one aspect of our human constitution.
Emotions, passions, desires-these too are part of what makes us who we are, and these
elements are fully implicated in the world of the contingent (Nussbaum 1986, 141 ff.).
How is it possible to lead a fully good life without acknowledging the values associated
with these faculties? Nussbaum understands the Republic to deny any intrinsic value to
such non-rational feelings and desires, and as such their objects would not be components
of happiness (144 fO. 69 Thus does Plato, on Nussbaum's reading, elaborate an account
of human nature and human values that rips out, root and branch, all those elements that
cannot preemptively be put out of reach of fortune's grasp.
69 Nussbaum supports her reading with passages from the Phaedo and Gorgias, among other dialogues; I
do not think (and will later argue) that the Republic alone does not univocally support this interpretation.
-------------_._-----
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This thumbnail sketch ofNussbaum's critique readies us for Plato's defense.
Minimally, he must defend two fronts: (1) he must show why acting justly always
promotes our happiness better than acting unjustly, and thus demonstrate that Herodotus'
Gyges is in fact not better off for choosing as he did; (2) he must explain how reason, or
philosophy, can inform our interests in a way that does not simply repress our other
feelings and desires, and can create a flourishing life that is truly worth living.
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CHAPTER IV
PLATO'S PROGRESS: UNPACKING HERODOTUS IN REPUBLIC I
be/Tal fJa8dat; rppovrfbOt; rIOJT17P[OV,
b[K17V KOAvjJfJ17Tfjp0t;, it; fJv80v jJOAE: IV
bebopKOt; ojJjJa, jJ17b' dyav cjJVOJjJEvOV.
Surely there is need of deep and salutary counsel;
need for a keen-sighted eye, not o'ermuch confused,
to descend, like some diver, into the depths.
(Aeschylus, Suppliant Maidens, 407-9, trans. H.W. Smyth)
And so Socrates went down, at the beginning of the Republic, to Piraeus, in order
to take in festivities with his fellow Athenians. Soon enough, as chance would have it, he
became engrossed in a lengthy discussion on the nature and utility ofjustice
(blKalOrIUv17). Three interlocutors and thirty Stephanus pages in, Socrates has managed to
reduce even fierce Thrasymachus to a nodding, if defiant, submission. But no one-least
of all Socrates himself-is satisfied with their progress, 'from our discussion it turns out
for me that I know nothing' (354b9-cl).7o The casual reader may be inclined to take
Thrasymachus' cue that all this eristic swashbuckling has been part of the festival's
entertainment, a pantomimed preamble to the serious business of rest of the Republic
(354alO-ll).71 This chapter will attempt to show that book one accomplishes some
significant work, dramatically demonstrating how ordinary moral agents can err, can go
70 The similarity of the end of book one with the earlier, so-called Socratic dialogues, has often been
remarked. For this classicly Socratic egress in ignorance, cf., for example, the end of the Charmides,
Lysias, Protagoras. Here, as throughout, 'Socrates' should be understood as the Platonic Socrates.
71 Aristotle likens the Socratic dialogues to mimes at Poetics l447b9-11.
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wrong in their deliberations, and how the Socratic elenchus is of limited help in setting
them aright. It will turn out that the ways in which Cephalus, Polemarchus, and
Thrasymachus each miss the mark correspond to one of the knotted threads discernable in
Herodotus' Gyges, each one now disentangled and laid out for consideration.
Cephalus' Dark Dreams
II se joue unjeu...ou il arrivera croix ou pile. Que gagerez-vous?
There is a game on...where heads or tails will turn up. What will you wager?
(Pascal, Pensees, 223)
The aged Cephalus, the first of Socrates' interlocutors, is perhaps neither so pious,
nor so morally complacent as variously interpreted.72 His congenial and breezy
demeanor belie his clear (if somewhat myopic) grasp of the questions put to him, and his
early departure may signal little more than that he has learned, through long acquaintance
with Socrates, to flee while he may before Athens' gadfly.73 Socrates first asks him
whether he finds old age grievous, wishing to learn from Cephalus' life experience.74
Cephalus acknowledges that most of his peers vituperate their hoary senility, and lament
youthful pleasures 10st,75 as though now they were but shades of their former substance,
72 Annas (1981, 18-23) maintains the latter interpretation, Reeve (1988, 5-7) the former. But many
commentators pass right over him without much comment. Broadly I agree with Irwin's reading (1995,
170-71) of him.
73 Though I will suggest a further reason for his departure.
74 A common scenario in the early dialogues. The presumption is that one who has experience in a field
will best be able to give an account of it (e.g. Gorgias the rhetor of rhetoric, Laches the general of courage,
Euthyphro, who claims knowledge of things divine, of piety).
75 The usual suspects: 'sex, wine, feasts, and such things that pertain to these.. .' (329a4-6).
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deprived of all that made life worthwhile. Yet these pleasures cannot carry such intrinsic
value as to alone make a good life, Cephalus counters, since he, for one, is relieved to
have escaped them, 'as if fleeing some raving and savage master' (329c3-4).76 No, it is
rather the character of a man that determines how he finds old age: if he is moderate and
good tempered, then old age is only moderately toilsome; but ifnot, then both youth and
old age will be difficult.
Already Cephalus has said much that Socrates readily would grant. And he has
exhibited some critical chops as well: he is able casually to dissect his contemporaries'
view that life bereft of youthful pleasures is necessarily wretched, on their assumption
that pleasure is what makes a good life good, while at the same time he points to what he
considers the true cause of hardship, an ill-ordered character.77 For those pleasures are
neither necessary nor sufficient for faring well in any period of life. Though Cephalus is
suggesting that good character is necessary, he has given no indication that it is sufficient.
Socrates follows up by asking Cephalus whether it is not really his wealth, rather
than his character, that enables him gracefully to accommodate his old age. Cephalus
readily grants that even a good man, if both old and impoverished, would not be
altogether untroubled, but adds that wealth without good character will never produce
tranquility. So wealth, if conjoined with the right character, can prove beneficial.
76 Cephalus is here quoting Sophocles, whom he once overheard talking about such matters.
77 fila TIC; aida E(J'nv, Duro rfjpac;, aM' 0 rp67roc; rwv avepW7rwv, 'There is some one cause, and not old
age, but men's way oflife' Rep. 329d3-4. Even at the outset we fmd a theme suggestively sketched that
will be rendered in detail in the course of the dialogue.
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Wealth is primarily useful, Cephalus tells Socrates, in order to pay any
outstanding debt, any recompense due for past wrongdoing, be it to a god or a man.
For when a man supposes that he is near to death, fear and concern come to him
regarding his past affairs, which did not bother him before. And those tales told
about the underworld, how the man who is unjust here must pay the penalty there;
and though he derided these tales in the past, at that point they torture his soul
should they prove true...So he becomes filled with fear and at that point reckons
up and looks to whether he has wronged anyone. And the one discovering in his
own life many wrongs, like a child he often starts up from his sleep and is afraid,
and lives with the expectation of evil to come (330d5-33Ial).
Wealth's chief benefit, then, is to hedge one's bets against punishment, ifnot in this life
then in the next. But surely even good men sometimes err and do wrong, and would find
wealth useful. Since Cephalus considers himself a basically good man, and finds wealth
beneficial, he acknowledges such mistakes as his own; for a life without wrongdoing
would have little need of these resources.78
Socrates does not follow up on the instrumental value of wealth suggested here,
but we may well pause to consider it. For it does not seem entirely consistent with what
Cephalus said earlier.79 For if wealth is the good through which one can barter right for
wrong, then wealth-however obtained-would seem the best insurance against
judgment. If those nocturnal nightmares, those somnolent signs of an uneasy conscience,
may be allayed through the appropriate application of wealth, then why should one
trouble with the toil of forming a good character? Why not, rather, grasp wealth by
whatever means available, and thereby enjoy both comfort in this life, and, through the
78 That he considers himself just is implied in his using himself as a counter-example to his fellows who
consider the loss of youthful pleasures a bane. It should be noted that Cephalus' valuation of wealth differs
in its object from the money-making man described at 554a ff., whose pecuniary desires bend all his efforts
to the accumulation of wealth for its own sake.
79 Cpo Harrison (2002, 28-29): 'the whole treatment of Cephalus is eminently consistent in all its careful
detail. '
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appropriate sacrifices, secure serenity with regard to the next? Indeed, Herodotus' Gyges
seems not to have shunned injustice's profit: recall that after slaying the king and
ascending to the throne, he sent lavish offerings to Delphi in atonement for his injustice. 8o
Now Cephalus' ambivalence about the relative importance of character and
wealth with respect to one's well-being turns on his underlying belief that an upright
character, however praiseworthy, is only weakly connected to securing one's best overall
end.81 Adequate resources playa crucial role, if only they are put to the appropriate use.
However much he may champion the virtues of character, his life spent recuperating the
family wealth betrays his primary preoccupation.82 Moreover, Cephalus, just like Gyges,
is motivated by fear of consequences. This fear is buried beneath his placid exterior, but
it drives his twilight offerings, and occludes any openness to realigning his fundamental
commitments. The consequences Cephalus fears are not those born of a single moment's
choice, the issue of the particular situation, as they were for Gyges. They are rather
weighed on the balance of one's life as a whole, and so far more significant. Looking
back on his life, and forward to possible consequences, then, for Cephalus involves the
need to perform certain actions to hedge against an uncertain future, and thus secure the
best overall well-being for himself.
80 Adeimantus will pick up and expand this line of thought in book two: 'These same [authorities] say that
the gods are persuaded and induced by sacrifices and kindly vows and votive offerings...So if they are to be
trusted, we ought to act unjustly and to make sacrifices from the ill-gotten gains' (365e2-366al).
81 Herodotus accepts the same principle, but for a reason contrary to Cephalus: for Herodotus, our choices
are only weakly linked to our happiness because of the caprice of fortune; for Cephalus, the link is weak
because of ability of wealth to amend whatever fortune or, indeed, choice, has wrought. Plato would
expect the reader, naturally, to think ahead to the family's catastrophic fall some years after the close of the
dialogue; they would foresee that wealth could not forestall it.
82 Cephalus discusses his family's affairs at 330bl-7. He has labored to restore the patrimony amassed by
his grandfather and squandered by his father.
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Socrates surely has seen the difficulties inherent in Cephalus' view. Distilling
from Cephalus' comments, Socrates asks, 'But are we to affirm that this thing itself,
justice, is thus without qualification truthfulness and giving back whatever one has
received from another, or is it possible that these very actions are sometimes just and
other times unjust?,83 Of course Cephalus did not intend to give an account of the nature
ofjustice. Yet Socrates foists this on him because Cephalus' position suggests that
justice is performative, that is, carried out in the performance of certain actions. 84 By
challenging the conventional view that justice is reducible to a set of actions, specifiable
by rules, Socrates would clear the way for resituatingjustice as primarily a property of
moral agents, not actions. 85
Socrates does not await Cephalus' answer, he instead gives an example of why
this account cannot be right: if a friend loans you weapons, but subsequently goes raving
mad, then surely it would not be just to tell him the truth and give him back his
weapons. 86 Cephalus readily concedes this, but he does not remain to have his views
further examined. Instead he exits with a laugh, handing the argument over to his son
83 331 c1-5. Shorey (1946, 1: 19) remarks on this passage that 'it is a Platonic Doctrine that no act is per se
good or bad.' Cf. Statesman 294b: 'Because law could never, by determining exactly what is noblest and
most just for one and all, enjoin upon them that which is best; for the differences of men and of actions and
the fact that nothing, I may say, in human affairs is ever at rest, forbid any science whatsoever to
promulgate any imple rule for everything and for all time.' (trans. Fowler) What is said there about law is
equally applicable to moral rules.
84 The transition is less jarring in Greek, as second part of the expression !Jlt56va.z !J[1C1]V, 'to pay a penalty,'
mentioned by Cephalus in his description of what the unjust must do in Hades (330d8), is cognate with
<3 lKa.lO(JUv1], 'justice.' See Havelock (1978) for an interesting study on the evolution of the notion of justice.
85 Pace Annas (1981, 22).
86 Cf. Herodotus' Gyges inability to discern factors that would yield exceptions to the generally binding
claim ofking's commands.
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Po1emachus, and heads off to the sacrifices. For Cepha1us has made his wager, as Pascal
might put it, and seems to believe that it is better, at this late hour of his life, to heed the
tales of post-mortem punishment and perform the requisite sacrifices; if the stories prove
untrue, then he will have lost little, but if they are true, then he has everything to gain.87
Polemarchus and the Risks of Refutation
cX(Uvc:roz mcowavrc:c; KO)(pOlrnv EofKwn' rpO:rZc; aUrolm JlaprvpC:l7rapc:6vrac; cX7rc:iVal.
They are void of understanding, although having heard [the truth]88 they are like unto the
deaf. The saying 'absent while present' bears witness to them.
(Heraclitus, fr. 34)
We shall consider Po1emarchus primarily as representative of the kind of ordinary
moral agent that appeals to canonical thinkers or beliefs to justify a claim, but without
being able to assess adequately the strengths and weaknesses of the precepts on their own
merits. 89 Even if there is merit to these beliefs, they will hold limited benefit for the
uncritical adherent; for it leaves his or her beliefs prone to attack and upheaval by one
more clever in the arts of argument and persuasion. And once these beliefs are
87 Pensees, 223. Reeve (1988, 9) implausibly claims that 'Cephalus cannot benefit from the elenchus
because his character is already as good as Socrates'.' Cephalus does not benefit from it rather because
fear of uncertainty ultimately precludes him rethinking his deeply-held values, and how they relate to one
another. R. Robinson notes (1966, 7) that Cephalus is one of the only cases that Socrates converses with
someone without refuting him; of course this is simply because he doesn't give Socrates the chance.
88 Following T.M. Robinson's (1987) conjecture.
89 By limiting our perspective we will not elaborate other aspects of the discussion between Socrates and
Polemarchus, because they relate only peripherally to the concerns ofthis paper. It is worth noting, in
passing, that here we fmd (if we follow Cross and Woozley (1966, 13 ff.), whom I think get it right) Plato's
critique of his own use ofthe craft (T£XV17) analogy, on the ground that skills, unlike the virtues, can admit
of contrary valuations, can confer either benefit or harm. Cf. Aristotle NE 1129a11-17, where he asserts
that justice cannot be a faculty (owalJ/!:;) or a science for this very reason. Kahn (1996, 148) argues that
craft becomes dialectic (OIOJ.£KTIKf)), the philosopher's master art, in the central books of the Republic.
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unanchored, and the moral agent is left adrift in the grey expanse of doubt, then there is
potential---depending, perhaps, on whether the untethering influence is that of a Socrates
or a Thrasymachus-for the agent to realign his or her commitments narrowly to satisfY
selfish interests and desires.9o Polemarchus does not come to this end, but it is no
accident that his place in the discussion is taken over by Thrasymachus, who fully
evinces this model.
Polemarchus defends the account ofjustice that Socrates has just overturned by a
simple appeal to authority: 'By all means it is so, Socrates, at least if we must have
confidence in Simonides' (331d4-5).91 Now to one who would grant the unquestionable
authority of Simonides, the only remaining issue would be whether or not Simonides
actually says what is attributed to him. But Socrates prods Polemarchus to interpret and
defend his authority, rather than just genuflect before it. Accordingly Polemarchus offers
that Simonides means that 'it is just to render to each one what is due [6qJclA6Ju~va]'
(331e3-4). Yet again Socrates presses Polemarchus to specifY what this means, since
presumably it cannot mean what was just refuted, namely, that one return borrowed
weapons to a madman. Moreover, the notion of 'what is due' is vague enough to admit
90 This kind of person is discussed in book seven (538c6-539al): 'We have, I suppose, beliefs from our
childhood concerning just and fine things in which we have been reared, just as children by parents,
obeying and honoring them...When a questioner comes and asks a man of this type, 'What is the fme [TO
KaA.6v]7,' and having answered what he heard from the lawgiver, the argument refutes him, and both
frequent and diverse refutations overthrow him, so that a thing is no more fme than shameful, and similarly
concerning the just and the good and those things which he most of all held in honor...Then, when he no
longer considers these things honorable and proper, as he did before, and is unable to discover the truth, is
it possible that, in all likelihood, he will go over to any other sort of life other than the one that flatters his
desires?'
91 Poets were the traditional moral teachers of the Greeks. Simonides was a Greek poet to whose authority,
like Homer's, it was common to appeal. Plato constantly plays with this poetic tradition, and often
ironically affIrms the wisdom of poets, as seen in Socrates' reply: 'But surely it is not easy to disbelieve
Simonides, for he is a wise and inspired man' (331 e5-6). Cf. 334al0-b5.
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several articulations, some of which Socrates would embrace, but others reject.92 Finally
Polemarchus settles on the traditional formula that one ought to help friends and harm
enemies. 93 He has not strayed far from the proverbial tree.
Working from this traditional account ofjustice, Socrates, quickly puts
Polemarchus back on his heels. His first two arguments, the details of which are not
important here, exploit the assumed similarity of acti~g justly to the exercise of other
skills or crafts; by the end of the first Socrates leads Polemarchus to conclude that the
unique domain ofjustice is so narrow as to be nearly useless; by the end of the second,
Polemarchus admits that the just man is skilled equally in acts of injustice as he is in acts
ofjustice.94 Neither of these arguments is very convincing, and one has the distinct
impression that a sharper opponent would have challenged Socrates on a number of
points that Polemarchus concedes. At any rate, when Socrates asks him whether this was
what he meant by his original claim, Polemarchus exclaims, 'Not at all, by Zeus! But I
no longer know what I meant.' And yet, for all his bewilderment, he adds, 'Nevertheless
I still believe this: justice is helping one's friends, and harming one's enemies' (334b7-
9). Polemarchus is not yet shaken from his position because the first two arguments
92 Socrates makes a similar manoeuver at 338c5-339b7. Thrasymachus has defined justice as 'the
advantage of the stronger,' and Socrates seeks similar clarification, 'since I also agree that the just is some
sort of advantage.' See Dougherty (2007) for an analysis of this passage, and a discussion of how what may
seem an eristic move on Socrates' part is merely a goad to get his interlocutor to clarify an equivocal term.
93 See Blundell (1989, chapter 2): 'Greek popular thought is pervaded by the assumption that one should
help one's friends and harm one's enemies' (26).
94 Both of these arguments exhibit an inductive component, which Kraut (1983,59-60) rightly notes as
frequently part of the Socratic elenchus. This is a corrective to Vlastos' (1983) account of the elenchus,
which will be discussed shortly.
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depend on premises that he holds with less conviction than his original thesis and his
firm, if conventional, belief that justice must be a good.95
Before turning to Socrates' next move, let us disengage from the passage and
consider the Socratic elenchus itself, in its assumptions and application. Some
understanding the basic outlines of the method will enable us to see its limitations, and
prepare the way for Plato's methodological shift.96 The term 'elenchus' is related to the
verb EA£)J7aIZV, 'to cross-examine, question; to disprove, confute.' Socrates himself does
not systematically discuss his method; it is left to the reader to reconstruct and analyze.
Two aspects of the elenchus will concern us: the conditions and assumptions necessary
to get it off the ground, and the method's basic procedure which almost inevitably ends in
refutation.
The elenchus may be described roughly as an evaluation of an individual's
beliefs, effected through the interplay of short questions and answers, seeking moral
truth.97 It is fundamentally social by nature, flexible and responsive in the manner
peculiar to conversation. 98 In principle anyone who shows an interest in such matters
95 Socrates appeals directly to a related assumption about justice at 335c4: 'And is not justice the
excellence proper to human beings?' Polemarchus readily grants it. This is worth noting, because
Thrasymanchus will deny the conventional view that justice is a good, which makes his refutation more
difficult (348e5-349a3).
96 This brief sketch cannot aspire to completeness. Fuller treatment of the elenchus may be found in R.
Robinson (1966) and Vlastos (1983).
97 For this last feature, which is not wholly uncontroversial, see Vlastos (1983, 32-34). The pursuit of the
truth is one feature (another is saying only what one believes) that distinguishes the elenchus from eristic,
which seeks only argumentative victory, by whatever means.
98 Unlike the written word: 'You would think that they speak as though having intelligence, but if you ask
something of the words, wishing to understand them, they always signify one and the same thing. And once
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may be subject to Socrates' examination,99 but in practice he usually engages those who
have some expertise, some pretense to knowledge. Socrates, of course, claims only to
know that he knows nothing. 100 Though his examination is always of some individual's
beliefs, it is equally concerned with articulating the best life for a human being. 101 The
presumption is that everyone desires to live the best life afforded mortals, and that if this
life can clearly be set out, of what the happy life consists, then by that very understanding
one should be motivated to attain it. Knowledge, then, yields not only justification, but
also motivation for living a certain kind oflife. This is why Socrates insists that his
interlocutor always say what he truly believes, in order that, by overturning false beliefs,
he may effect a therapeutic result that amounts to nothing short of a conversion to the
pursuit of the best human life. 102
it is written, every word is tossed about everywhere, equally among those who understand, and similarly
among those who have no interest in the matter, and it does not know to whom it should speak or not; and
when it is wronged or unfairly reviled it always stands in need of its father as a source of help; for it has no
power to protect or help itself' (Phaedrus, 275d-e). Socrates, in the Apology, likens his defense, which
cannot proceed by question and answer, to 'fighting with shadows' (l8d). Speeches are little better, as set
speech opposed to set speech requires not only the speakers, but also judges to decide between them.
Conversation requires only the persons involved, their own beliefs and own admissions (348al-b7).
99 'I shall never stop philosophizing and exhorting you, and pointing out [the truth] to anyone of you whom
1 happen upon...who says that he does care [about virtue] .. .' (Apology 29d-e).
100 So says Socrates at the end of book one (353b9-cl): 'From our discussion it thus turns out for me that 1
know nothing.' Cf. Gorgias 509a4-6, Apology 21 d2-6. The Platonic Socrates, though, will of course seem
to have a number of beliefs he considers true through the course of the Republic.
101 See the quote heading the introduction. Cf. Gorgias 500c3-4.
102 Which life, for Socrates, is the life of virtue. Later in book one (346a3-4), Socrates urges Trasymachus,
'Do not answer contrary to your belief, in order that we may accomplish something.' Cf. Gorgias 500b,
Crito 49d. Sesonske (1961, 34) misses this connection between truth and motivation when he claims that
'the essential characteristic for Socrates of oral argument is not truth but conviction.' There is a strong
cognitive component to virtue for Socrates and Plato, where knowledge of, say, justice, is necessary for
being truly just.
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The elenchus is able to proceed when Socrates' interlocutor has put forward some
thesis, usually in answer to a 'what is Xl' question, which seeks the essential nature of
the concept under consideration. 103 Socrates, after clarifying the thesis, then asks his
interlocutor whether he would grant certain additional premises; these are not themselves
argued for, but accepted as true. 104 (These additional premises are usually those that
Socrates himself would grant, though this is neither made explicit nor essential to the
argument.) From these additional premises the denial of the original thesis is derived,
and Socrates' interlocutor admits that this contradiction follows from the argument.
At this point there are two choices available to Socrates' interlocutor. He has
conceded that his set of beliefs is inconsistent, that his beliefs cannot together be true. So
one or more of the beliefs must be rejected or modified; either he can withdraw his initial
thesis, or he may reject one (or more) of the additional premises. Socrates does not
himself indicate what his interlocutor should do. lOS One might expect an obstinate
opponent to reject one of the additional premises to preserve his original thesis and his
103 This corresponds to what we might call a 'real defmition.' See Moore (1966,8) for kinds of defmition,
R. Robinson (1966, chapter 6) for the 'what is x?' question. Examples are 'what is piety?' (Euthyphro),
'what is courage?' (Laches), and in the Republic, 'what is justice?;' here the question is reached in a rather
backdoor manner, as we have seen in the discussion of Cephalus.
104 Vlastos (1983, 40-41) points out that these are not accepted because they are self-evident truths, or
because they necessarily represent the most widely-accepted belief on the subject; Socrates is only
concerned with whether his interlocutor will accept them. This pattern here presented roughly follows
Vlastos' 'standard elenchus' (39), but trimmed of the more controversial (and as I think, less plausible)
features.
105 Though Vlastos (39) thinks that Socrates claims to have proven the denial of the thesis true, and the
thesis itself false. This view is also supported by Irwin (1995), see n. 107, infra. A weaker version will do
for our purposes (whatever Socrates may have thought): that this argument cannot be used to show the truth
of the thesis. For other arguments could be proffered in support ofthe thesis; we could claim that one
argument has invalidated them all only if the other premises are necessary or self-evident truths, and so
cannot reasonably be rejected.
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pride. But usually the premise to be dropped is the thesis itself. 106 This is presumably
because the honest interlocutor will see that, upon reflection, his thesis has less
plausibility, or is less bound up with other deeply-held beliefs, than the other premises. 107
If the thesis is abandoned, then another may be offered; but against each subsequent
definition the elenchus is renewed, until, at last, the interlocutor disengages in
puzzlement over the essential nature he thought he knew. 108
Let us return now to the text, and consider a case of the elenchus in action. 109
Recall that Polemarchus has clung to his thesis that justice consists in helping friends and
harming enemies. Socrates then gains assent for three additional premises: (l) that by
'friends,' Polemarchus means those whom a person deems good, and by 'enemies' those
deemed bad; (2) that people can make mistakes on this matter, so that many seeming
106 As Cephalus gave up his "defmition." Polemarchus on the other hand, retained his defmition, because it
is a piece of received wisdom that was more deeply engrained than the other premises. Thrasymachus will
tlY to save his thesis by modifYing a seemingly incontrovertible premise.
107 The problem as to which premise to reject has vexed many commentators, and is closely related to
Socrates' disavowal of knowledge. See Fine (1999,2: 2-5) for a survey of solutions. Irwin (1995, 17-21)
defends the view that Socrates believes he can derive positive conclusions from the elenchus because he
accepts the following two assumptions: (1) that his interlocutors will ultimately keep and reject the same
premises as other reflective moral agents would; (2) these judgments and decisions are justified. Since we
are concerned here not with what Socrates mayor may not know, but with the beliefs of his interlocutors,
we need not delve into this debate. Socrates is (as he himself said at Theatetus 149a ff.) merely the
midwife; his interlocutors must take ownership of their own beliefs.
108 Many scholars hesitate to attribute to the elenchus only a negative function, of showing that the
interlocutor's beliefs are inconsistent. See, for example, Kahn (1996, 137-142), Irwin (1995,20-21). As R.
Robinson (1966, 14) drolly remarks, 'Socrates was certainly a unique reformer ifhe hoped to make men
virtuous by logic.'
109 The elenchi in Republic 1, although mainly exhibiting the standard form, differ from many other
examples in the dialogues at least in this respect: Plato gives us good reason to suspect many of these cases
are in some way fallacious or at least unsound, which inadequacies are to be rectified by the constructive,
largely non-elenctic argument of the rest of the work.
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good are in fact bad, and vice versa; (3) those who are good are just. Socrates then draws
the net to a close, yielding the following elenchus:
(0) It is just to benefit friends and harm enemies.
(1) A friend is whomever one thinks good; an enemy whomever one thinks bad.
(2) It is possible to mistake a good person for a bad, and a bad person for a good.
(3) A good person is just (and a bad person unjust).
(4) Thus it is possible (if one errs) justly to harm a good person, and benefit a bad.
(5) Therefore it is possible justly to benefit one's enemies and harm one's friends
(334b1-d6).
Polemarchus sees, once Socrates reaches (4), that argument has gone awry, even before it
reaches the formal contradiction of his thesis in the conclusion. But this concern is not
because he thinks the argument is invalid, but because (4) entails a proposition that runs
contrary to his (unstated) belief that it is not the part ofjustice to harm those who are
good. Upon considering the premise set, he thinks that he should modifY (1) to make a
friend one who not only seems, but is, good, and the one who seems, but is not really, a
friend, an enemy.HO
It is worth noting that two important themes for the Republic are introduced in
the above elenchus. First, human beings are liable to make mistakes about what is of real
value, whether we're talking about relationships or other interests. Po1emarchus does not
challenge this premise; it is an empirical fact evidenced in everyday life. This mistake
regarding true value was also made by Herodotus' Gyges, and may be seen in any of a
number of examples from tragedy. 111 Second, and related to the first, is the distinction
between seeming and being, so fundamental to Plato's ethics, metaphysics, and
110 Note that among the premises (1) through (3), (2) and (3) are premises almost anyone would grant.
111 For example, Creon in Antigone.
-----------_._--
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epistemology.l12 The interconnectedness of these two themes is manifest in Polemarchus'
attempt to elude the elenchus' conclusion. By reformulating (1) he may preserve his
thesis for the moment, but it does not solve the epistemological problem that it raises, it
just shifts it to a different quarter: if, as Polemarchus now supposes, an enemy is one
who may seem a friend, but is not really so, then of course it is still possible to mistake
him for a friend. For unless one has some further criterion to determine the true state of
affairs, the being behind the seeming, the fact that both friend and enemy seem friendly is
no help at all.
From here Socrates constructs a final argument that will lead Polemarchus to
admit that ajust person does not harm anyone, whether friend or enemy. The argument is
particularly weak; 113 the fact the Polemarchus so quickly buckles before it underscores
his lack of skill and experience in argument. 114 Yet he believes that he has been given
sufficient reason to abandon his original thesis; since he values justice, he has been
shown (as he thinks) why it is in his interest not to harm anyone. From this point
forward, Polemarchus falls into the background of the dialogue, brushed aside by the
impatient Thrasymachus. Polemarchus has been purged of his conventional belief about
112 Its bearing on ethics will be seen in Glaucon's challenge; the metaphysical and epistemological
distinctions between appearance and reality, opinion and knowledge, as brought out in the central books of
the Republic, will only tangentially be discussed.
113 On the problems with this argument, see Allen (2002, 25), Cross and Woozley (1966, 21-22), and Annas
(1981, 31-33), who calls it 'the most dubious.' The argument is basically this: (1) To harm anything is to
make it worse with respect to its particular excellence (apef/]). (2) So to harm a man makes him worse with
respect to his particular excellence. (3) Man's particular excellence is justice. (4) Therefore, to harm a
man makes him less just, or unjust. (5) Therefore, Polemarchus' justice can make a man unjust.
114 Plato is surely aware that these arguments are fallacious. As Reeve (1988,8) observes, 'Socrates'
refutation of Polemarchus is flagged by Plato as trading on transparent misinterpretation, which
Polemarchus in neither sharp enough nor well trained enough to detect.'
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justice, but it is clear that he lacks the resources to replace it with a better account of its
nature. Had the dialogue ended with book one, Socrates' elenchus unwittingly may have
cracked the door to moral skepticism for Polemarchus. 115 Even had Polemarchus'
conventional notion ofjustice been substantially correct, his inability to defend it
adequately before an adroit opponent likely would have led to the same result.
Herodotus' Gyges is not all that dissimilar to Polemarchus in this respect: both proved
impotent to defend adequately their deeply held, but shallowly understood, conventional
principles; moreover, their principles were set aside because they were persuaded that it
was in their best interest to do so.
Thrasymachus and Elenctic Decline
Words had to change their ordinary meaning and to take that which was now given to
them. Reckless audacity came to be considered the courage of a loyal supporter; prudent
hesitation, specious cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness;
ability to see all sides of a question incapacity to act on any.. .Indeed it is generally the
case that men are readier to call rogues clever than simpletons honest, and are as ashamed
of being the second as they are proud of being the first.
(Thucydides, History ofthe Peloponnesian War, III.82, trans. Crawley)
As the conversation between Socrates and Polemarchus reaches an aporetic pause,
Thrasymachus erupts and overruns the discussion, his companions unable to restrain his
billowing frustration any longer, and he rains down spite and scorn upon the
115 So Reeve (1988, 9) thinks, adding that' Polemarchus can only be harmed by [the elenchus] because his
character is not yet fully formed.' Cf. Aristotle NE 1095 ff.
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interlocutors, who fly asunder before his onslaught. Impetuous and clever, he pillories
the simple-minded morality embraced by Polemarchus and Cephalus (and, we might add,
Herodotus' Gyges). From one perspective, he may be understood as isolating and
invigorating elements latent in these earlier figures, particularly the preoccupation with
consequences that promote one's perceived interests, separating them off from those
precepts of conventional morality with which they uncomfortably chafe. He represents,
in short, the logical end to which one may come, for whom the anchoring cords of
traditional morality have been cut. In opposition to the dully-moralizing Hesiod, the
canonical champion ofjustice, who blathers incessantly about the prosperity of the just
and wretched diminution of the unjust, Thrasymachus offers a view (he thinks) grounded
in reality, in the way the world actually works. 116 He offers no blandly prudent gnomes,
no fairytale rewards, no bedtime terrors; he offers only an unblinking view of one's
interests, and how to seize them.
Thrasymachus in fact offers three different formulations of the nature ofjustice,
which mayor may not be logically consistent with one another. ll? But more important
than these accounts are two beliefs underlying them, namely, that 'injustice is stronger,
freer, and more masterful than justice,' and 'the just man always and everywhere fares
116 Hesiod claims, for instance, 'Neither famine nor disaster ever haunt men who do true justice...They
flourish continually with all good things ...But for those who practice violence and cruel deeds far-seeing
Zeus, the son of Chronos, ordains a punishment. Often even a whole city suffers for a bad man who sins
and devises presumptuous deeds, and the son of Chronos lays great trouble upon the people, famine and
plague together, so that the men perish away, and their women do not bear children, and their houses
become few, through the contriving of Olympian Zeus' (Works and Days, 230-245, trans. Evelyn-White).
Il7 They are (1) justice is the advantage of the stronger (lCpefrrovoc;, 338c2-3); (2) justice is the advantage of
the rulers of an established government (338e6-339a2); (3) justice is the good of another (343c3-4). The
consistency of these propositions have been debated at length. See, e.g. Chappell (1993), who gives a brief
overview ofthe positions scholars have staked out. Given the right qualifications, it seems to me that they
can be made consistent with one another, though nothing hinges on this reading for this paper.
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worse than the unjust man.,118 Here we have the bare assertion of the immoralist,
enrobed in the finery of Realpolitik. Apart from fear ofgetting caught, the Thrasymachan
agent countenances no reason to be just. And if these beliefs are correct, then he has
warrant to pursue his injustice as far as his strength will permit. ll9 Justice is no longer a
virtue and a good for its possessor, but rather 'an altogether noble simplicity,' and
injustice 'good and prudent counsel.' 120 So contrary to the normal valence and
significance of these terms, injustice now usurps the mantle of wisdom and virtue, and
becomes dispenser of all good things.
While Thrasymachus may alter the usage of these terms to reflect his
understanding of how the world actually works, it tasks Socrates with a heightened
challenge. Polemarchus' refutation was due in no small part to his implicit agreement
that justice is a virtue and a good, and Socrates was able to appeal to his moral intuition
at critical points in the discussion. But any argument with Thrasymachus cannot proceed
118 344c5-7, 343d3, respectively. To the fIrst belief he adds the qualifIcation that it be practiced on a
suffIcienly grand scale.
119 Thrasymachus was not alone in these beliefs. Thucydides has the Athenian envoys to the Spartan
assembly state that 'it has always been the law that the weaker should be subject to the stronger. Besides,
we believed ourselves to be worthy of our position [of empire], and so you thought us till now, when
calculations of interest have made you take of the cry ofjustice-a consideration which no one ever yet
brought forward to hinder his ambition when he had the chance ofgaining anything by might' (1.76, trans.
Crawley). Note that, on this view, appeal to justice only arises when the strength of injustice fails. This
point is developed into the origins of a contractualist justice by Glaucon in book two.
120 7rclvV yevvafav etJl]eezav and eufJovJcfav, respectively (348cl2, d2).
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'speaking according to conventional beliefs.'121 Nevertheless, Socrates is willing to
treat Thrasymachus' claims seriously, assuming that he is still voicing his own beliefs. 122
The two beliefs mentioned above cap an encomium to injustice that
Thrasymachus forcefully delivers, after having been drawn-much to his dismay-into
contradiction by Socrates. One of the elenctic arguments that led to this point is worth
considering here (339b9 ff.), as it connects with Socrates' prior discussion with
Polemarchus, and points forward to a distinction that Plato himself embraces and
develops later in the Republic, which will be crucial to his defense ofjustice.
In elaboration of his first account ofjustice as the advantage of the stronger,
Thrasymachus avers that it is the stronger that rule, and as rulers, they craft laws that
preserve their advantage. Now since it is generally understood that it is just to obey the
laws under which one lives, it turns out that it is just for the ruled to do what is to the
advantage of the stronger, their rulers. This all seems plausible enough. Yet this account
ofjustice lies open to the very same difficulty Polemarchus encountered: 123 is it not
possible for the rulers to err, to legislate what they think is to their advantage, but that
actually results in their disadvantage? Surprisingly Thrasymachus grants this without
apparently seeing its consequence, and Socrates immediately draws the inference that it is
121 Kma Ta VOf-tlC;Of-tCVa. AEyovrer; (348e8-9).
122 Thrasymachus does not place any value on this feature of the elenchus, and the motivation of moral
refonn behind it. He seems to relish the thrust and parry of debate only with a view to victory. In response
to Socrates' expressed hope that he is speaking in earnest, he replies, 'What difference does this make to
you, whether it seems thus to me or not? Why not just examine the argument?' (349a9-1O)
123 See p. 53 supra.
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just not only to do what is advantageous, but also what is disadvantageous, for the rulers.
So justice cannot simply be the advantage of the stronger.
The first to acknowledge the contradiction is Polemarchus, who chimes in, 'Yes,
by Zeus, Socrates, the conclusion is absolutely clear' (340al-2). By choosing
Polemarchus to reenter the conversation briefly to corroborate the difficulty, we are
reminded that he too was stuck on this point; Plato is making the broader observation that
the possibility of error leaves a measure of insecurity in our judgments and plans, in the
very methods we use to reach for the good life. Polemarchus attempted to close this gap;
his attempt failed, though he did not recognize the failure, and Socrates did not press the
point.
Thrasymachus decidedly rejects a similar maneuver, offered by Cleitophon;
instead he saves his thesis by offering a clever amendment of the premise that landed him
in this discomfort: rulers to do not err insofar as they are rulers (340dl-341a4). When
rulers make a mistake, they are not called rulers with respect to this error; rulers, insofar
as they are rulers, never err. The same thing applies to experts in any discipline-
physicians, accountant, grammarians, and the like. So while rulers are ruling they make
no mistakes, but when they fail in their knowledge, and no longer are true craftsmen, then
they go astray. It is just our loose manner of speaking that attributes error to rulers or
other experts. Given that this distinction comes from the mouth of Thrasymachus, one
may suppose that he engages in logic chopping only as a means to avoid refutation. This
may well be the case. But Plato will pick up on this notion of the true ruler, one of a
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philosophic nature and training, whose knowledge would prevent him or her from falling
into the kinds of error we've seen exhibited in this paper thus far. 124
In the end, however, despite his twists and turns, Thrasymachus again gets caught
in the elenctic web. He is clearly frustrated: he had jumped into the fray expecting glory,
and has found that his prize is refutation. His own admissions have reduced him to a
sweating, blushing~yet still defiant-advocate of injustice (350c12 ff.). He claims he
still can meet Socrates' arguments, if only he be rid of all this back and forth, question
and answer, and be allowed to harangue at length. If Socrates insists on questioning him
further, he will answer 'as we do for old women telling tales, and say 'very well,' and
nod and shake my head' (350e2-4). In short, he refuses to answer according to his beliefs
as the elenchus requires. To his discredit, Socrates continues on, and rams home his
"refutation." The arguments he proffers are uneven, at best. And not surprisingly, no
one is satisfied when Socrates finally proclaims justice more profitable than injustice.
By the end of book one, the Socratic elenchus has unraveled, and its shortcomings
laid bare for the reader to see. Most fundamentally, the elenchus has proven ineffective
for its stated purpose. 125 Not a single one of Socrates' interlocutors, either here
elsewhere, has experienced a conversion to the pursuit of virtue by means of elenctic
refutation. Thrasymachus is perhaps the most spectacular failure on this front.
124 Our interest will not be with the ruler per se (since we will not consider Plato's political ideas), but with
the philosopher; these two are identical in Plato's ideal city.
125 See earlier discussion, pp. 49-52, supra. Cf. Apology 36c5-7, where Socrates proclaims to the
Athenians: '1 attempted to persuade each ofyou not to care for his possessions before caring for himself,
that he should be as good and wise as possible.. .' And again, Apology 38al-6: 'You will not believe me, as
though 1 were speaking ironically, ifI say again that this happens to be the greatest good for man: to talk
about virtue every day, and other things, concerning which you hear me speaking and examining myself
and others, and that the unexamined life is not worth living for mankind.'
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Another problem is that the elenchus can only guarantee valid, not sound,
arguments. The first book of the Republic offers several elenctic arguments that rely on
dubious, or at least uncertain, premises. If the purpose of the elenchus is to persuade an
interlocutor to emend his beliefs through argument, it seems that Socrates himself can at
times get in the way. As Adeimantus later says,
No one, Socrates, would be able to controvert these statements of yours. But, all
the same, those who occasionally hear you argue feel in this way: They think that
owing to their inexperience in the game of question and answer they are at every
question led astray a little bit by the argument, and when these bits are
accumulated at the conclusion of the discussion mighty is their fall and the
apparent contradiction of what they at first said; and that just as by expert
draught-players the unskilled are finally shut in and cannot make a move, so they
are finally blocked and have their mouths stopped by this other game of draughts
played not with counters but with words; yet the truth is not affected by the
outcome (487b 1-c4, trans. Shorey).126
Under such conditions the respondent inevitably loses his or her receptiveness to the
elenchus' therapeutic function. Even if one is convinced by an unsound elenchus, it is
unlikely that it will prove of lasting effect. We have all been persuaded by a speaker or
an argument at some time, but afterward, upon reflecting on the matter anew, once we
come to realize that the reasoning was faulty or unclear in some way, then its power and
effect evaporate, and the previous opinion likely reasserts itself. Consider Polemarchus:
he was brought finally to relinquish his hold on his conviction that the just harm their
enemies. Yet even should the proposition that the just never harm anyone have merit, the
doubtful nature of the argument confuses the issue, and the inexperienced thinker may
easily mistake a poor argument for a poor conclusion.
126 Cf. Sesonske (1961, 34): 'The men, young and old, to whom Socrates brings his mission usually mean
what they say at the outset of the discussion; they begin with sincere assertions of their convictions. And
Socrates insistently sollicits agreement for each step of the developing argument. But somehow,
unaccountably, conviction drains off along the way.'
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A third reason the elenchus ultimately fails is because each of Socrates'
interlocutors brings a different disposition, upbringing, life experience, and rational
acuity to the conversation, which undoubtedly clouds or conditions the elenchus'
effectiveness. Hence Cephalus run off to the sacrifices, unphased by Socrates'
questioning, Thrasymachus smoulders recalcitrantly, and Polemarchus is left an empty
vessel, purged of its contents but without replenishment. Now even if an elenchus
proceeds flawlessly to its end, these other contingent factors largely determine how the
interlocutor will modify his or her beliefs relative to other commitments and values. 127
Plato will not abandon the elenchus all together. But he comes to understand that
it is only one part of the puzzle of nurturing virtuous and happy human beings. In a later
dialogue, the elenchus is described as preliminary to a broader educational program; like
a physician who purges the patient's body before other treatment may begin, so the
elenchus is a purgative of one's false beliefs, and prepares the way for true knowledge
(Sophist 22ge-230e).
127 '[The elenchus] only tells you that you are wrong, and does not also tell you why' (R. Robinson, 1966,
17).
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CHAPTER V
PLATO'S GYGES
K~ b 'av ei~ xpfjJw KarlJprlJjJ.Evov jJ.ovvapxflJ, TTl E(CCm avevOUvctJ 7rOzEelV r fJoukraz; Kai
yap av rov apuITov avbpwv 7ravrwv lJTQvra £~ TaUrlJV ba~ rwv EW06rWV VOlJjJ.Crrwv
(JTr](Jele. tyyfveraz jJ.Ev yap of UfJP1~ lnrO rwv 7rape6vrwv O:yaOwv, qJ06vo~ M apxfjOev
EjJ.qJUeral avOpW7rctJ. buo b' E;(wv rarJra E;(el 7ra(Jav KaK6r1Jra' ra jJ.Ev yap ufJPl
KeKOPlJjJ.EvOC; Ep&l 7rO)vAa Kai ma(J8aAa.
How indeed is it possible that monarchy should be a well-adjusted thing, when it allows a
man to do as he likes without being answerable? Such license is enough to stir strange
and unwonted thoughts in the heart of the worthiest of men. Give a person this power,
and straightaway his manifold good things puffhim up with pride, while envy is so
natural to human kind that it cannot but arise in him. But pride and envy together include
all wickedness; both leading on to deeds of savage violence.
(Herodotus, Histories, III.80, trans. Rawlinson)
Now Glaucon, who quietly followed the discussion to this point, would not let the
matter rest. For he perceived that, though Thrasymachus may have been 'charmed like a
serpent,' the best statement of his position was not refuted (358b2-3). Accordingly, he
articulates a new defense of injustice, though it does not reflect his own beliefs, which he
challenges Socrates to overturn. 128 Despite taking the form of a renewed defense of
injustice, it is perhaps better recognized as the beginning of Plato's response, since the
way in which the challenge is framed influences, to a significant extent, the shape ofthe
rebuttal.
128 Glaucon makes it clear that Thrasymachus is not the only adherent of his so-called pragmatism: 'It does
not at all seem thus to me, Socrates. And yet I am at a loss when my ears are deafened by hearing
Thrasymachus' arguments and those of countless others' (358c6-d1).
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As a preliminary to his defense, Glaucon introduces a three-fold division of
goods. Goods may be desired (1) only for their own sake (aUra aUrou EvcKa), (2) only
for the sake of their consequences, (3) both for themselves and for their consequences. 129
Some clarification is needed here. By (1), he means 'what power [JUva,LUv] each one has
in itself [aUra KaB' aUro] dwelling in the soul' (358b5-6). This signals that the distinction
between the first two classes is not quite that of our modem division of intrinsic and
extrinsic worth; for not all consequences are excluded from (1).130 The consequences of
justice or injustice may be conceived as falling into two kinds: either those derived
internally from the thing itself, through its own nature (included in class I), or those
derived externally from being perceived by other people as being just or unjust (class 2).
Most people, Glaucon continues, would place justice in the 'toilsome category of goods
[i.e. class 2], which must be practiced for the sake of rewards and good reputation based
on the opinion of others, but that in its own right it ought to be avoided, since it is
grievous' (358a4-6).13l Socrates, on the other hand, while he grants the existence of
these three classes, places justice in the third, which he considers the finest.
129 357b4-d2, presented in a slightly different order. In (1) Glaucon places such goods as joy and harmless
pleasures that result in nothing other than their enjoyment; in (2) we fmd goods that are in themselves
onerous, but chosen for their benefits, e.g., exercise, medical treatment, moneymaking; (3) contains such
goods as wisdom, health, and sight.
130 And so this corresponds neither to a stictly utilitarian nor deontological demarcation, into which modem
ethical theores tend to divide.
131 It is worth noting that 'the many' view justice as some kind of good, albeit an instrumental one, contrary
to Thrasymachus, who would not openly affirm this. Yet, as perhaps Glaucon saw, it was implicit in his
view: surely the ruled derive some beneifit, some good, from obeying the laws of their rulers, in the form
of social stability and the rule of law (however skewed to the favor of the rulers as it may be).
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On behalf of a strictly instrumental justice, Glaucon develops his defense along
three fronts. First, he gives an account of the origin and nature ofjustice; then, he
furnishes a 'great proof [ury<x TcKJ1fJplOV] that no one practices justice willingly, but only
from necessity; and finally, he justifies this practice on the grounds that the unjust person
is better off by far than the just (358b8-c5, d5 ff.).
The Origin and Nature of Justice
Justice, Glaucon proposes, is nothing other than a grand compromise between
greed and fear. By nature, everyone desires to perpetrate injustice as a good, but fears the
even greater evil of suffering injustice at the hands of others (358e4 ff.).132 One's ability
to do the former but avoid that latter depends on strength, as Thrasymachus suggested;
yet since most people lack the force to reliably press their advantage, they consider it to
their overall benefit to agree with one another neither to commit nor suffer injustice. In
this way laws and institutions sprang forth, and so too justice, for this is its origin, and its
nature nothing but a second-best safeguard.
Describing the essential nature ofjustice is a crucial preliminary to understanding
its power and benefit. This was one of the glaring inadequacies of book one, where,
since Socrates and Thrasymachus could not agree on the nature ofjustice, any discussion
132 Glaucon is here making use of the then-widespread distinction between vOf-lOC; and rpumc;, between
convention (or law) and nature, to explain the origins of the social contract. On this distinction, see Guthrie
(1971,55-130). Cf. also Gorgias 492c, and Protagoras 322b for use of the same distinction, but with
opposing valence (Callicles promotes brutish nature, and Protagoras civilizing law). Life without just
institutions may resemble what Plato later says in a different context: 'with eyes ever bent upon the earth
and heads bowed down over their tables people feast like cattle, grazing and copulating, ever greedy for
more of these delights; and in their greed kicking and butting one another with horns and hooves of iron
they slay one another in sateless avidity... ' (586a6-b3, trans. Shorey).
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as to whether it was a good or not, or more or less a benefit than injustice to its possessor,
was severely undermined. Socrates compares their failure to take the inquiry in the proper
order to be 'like gluttons, with their grabbing hands, always tasting whatever is passed
along before adequately enjoying the preceding dish' (354bl-3).133 Indeed, this priority
of definition will be one of the salient features of Socrates' defense.
Gyges and his Ring
Next Glaucon offers a thought experiment as proof that, even with the above
social contract in force, anyone afforded sufficient strength or stealth to commit injustice
would choose injustice over justice (359b7 ff.).134 Imagine that two people, one just and
the other unjust, are granted the power or license (t<;ov(J[av) to do whatever they desire.
Glaucon imagines, by way of digression, this license to be of the sort that came by chance
to Gyges the Lydian (359dl ff.).135
133 Glaucon's working account ofjustice presented here, however loose and imcomplete it may be, is
sufficient for his purposes; he is anticipating that Socrates will provide a different, and better, defmition in
his defense.
134 The minor theme of force and stealth appear occasionally throughout the dialogue, e.g., when
Thasymachus told Socrates that he would never get the best ofhim in arguement, by force or stealth
(341 a9-b2); it also occurs throughout Herodotus, where all sorts of stratagems succeed where strength
alone is insufficient.
135Some scholars deny that this refers to the same Gyges of the Herodotus tale, but rather his ancestor. The
OCT text edited by Slings (2003) here reads TcfJ TJyov TOU AV60u n:poy6vcp, 'to the ancestor ofGyges the
Lydian.' See Adam's (1965) appendix to book two for support of this reading. A variant reading in Proclus
and various manuscripts, and followed by Shorey (1946), is TWI yJyt'/I, 'to Gyges, the ancestor of the
Lydian,' the Lydian presumably being Croesus. Shubert (1997,256,258) drops the Tlryov, 'ofGyges,'
which was also bracketed by Ross, the former editor of the OCT text. I follow Shorey's text here, and claim
that this is the same person as Herodotus' Gyges, based in part on the fact that Plato refers to 'Gyges' ring'
later, at 612b2, and in part because if we assume they are different, then we have two individuals (either
named or related to a Gyges), both of whom overthrew a king and thereby gained the Lydian throne and
queen. And this would be a coincidence beyond the realm of plausibility. Either way, it seems clear that
Plato is making reference to the Herodotus tale, whether or not we identify the characters or not. Naturally,
Plato is not presenting his tale as history, so we need not sharpen our knives over the identity of the two.
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Now Gyges, the story goes, was a shepherd in the service of the Lydian king.
One day, after heavy rains and an earthquake opened a chasm in the earth near where he
was shepherding, he went down and beheld many wonders, among which was a golden
ring on the finger of a huge corpse. Gyges slipped off the ring, and ascended out from
the pit. Later, at meeting of the shepherds, as he fumbled with the ring, he discovered
that ifhe turned the collet ofthe ring inward, he became invisible, as made clear by his
companions speaking of him as though absent. After experimenting with the ring for a
time, in order to ascertain its power, Gyges contrived to be sent as a messenger to deliver
the monthly shepherds' report to the king. Once there, he seduced the queen, then with
her complicity slew the king and seized the kingdom.
Returning to our just and unjust subjects, Glaucon bids us suppose that each is
given a ring similar to Gyges' in power, and that we follow each of them in imagination,
to wherever their desires take them. Glacuon supposes that the just and unjust alike
would gravitate to injustice, 'because of the grasping self-interest [lrAcovc6av] which by
nature people of every disposition pursue as a good, but by law perforce are diverted to
honor fairness (359c4-6).' In other words, but for the constraining force of law and social
convention, any person granted such power would run after injustice, just as Gyges did,
under the belief that it was to their own profit. In public all praise law, but in secret every
heart yearns for more.
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The Choice of Lives
But Glaucon wants more than a descriptive account, he also offers a prescriptive
one; that is, his challenge is not only to show that human beings do in fact behave in a
certain way, but also that they are justified in so acting. To this end he offers the so-
called Choice of Lives, a second thought experiment, in order to compare the life of the
most completely just and most completely unjust man, each the perfect (riAEOV)
representation of his kind, and see which one fares better in the course of their lives
(360d8 ff.).
Imagine first the completely unjust man. Let him be like a clever craftsman, who
knows the capabilities and limits of his art; he skillfully plies his craft of injustice without
getting caught, or if he does make some mistake, he is able, by persuasion or by force, to
correct it. But most of all, he must seem just even while perpetrating the greatest
injustices; he must reap the reputation and rewards that normally accrue to the just
person: wealth and friends, and all other such good things.
Next imagine the completely just man, Glaucon continues, 'a sincere and refined
man who, as Aeschylus says, desires not to seem but to be good; now take away the
seeming' (361b6-c1). All benefits that are laid upon the just by others must be removed,
transferred to his unjust counterpart, because otherwise it would not be clear whether the
just person chooses justice for itself or for these extraneous rewards. But even worse, let
the just man be assigned a reputation for the worst injustices, though he has done none,
even to the point of suffering torture and death.
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From these two cases, Glaucon concludes, it becomes clear that it is the seeming
that matters, not the being, at least when it comes to acting according to virtue. It is open
to the shrewd u~ust man, the champions of injustice say,
first to rule in his city, by seeming to be just, then to gain a wife from whatever
family he wishes, and to give his children to whomever he desires, to engage and
form partnerships with whomever he wishes, and in all these affairs to derive
profit and advantage, since he does not scorn committing injustice. Moreover,
entering into struggles, whether public or private, he prevails and claims a larger
share than his opponents; and, since he gains more, he is rich, and helps his
friends and harms his enemies, and renders sacrifices and sets up votive offerings
to the gods in a fitting and magnificent manner, and courts the gods and those
among men whom he wishes, far better than the just man, so that it is likely that
he is more dear to the gods than the just man. So much better, they say, Socrates,
is the life provided for the unjust man from gods and men than that for the just
man (362b2-c8).
Thus does Glaucon bring his argument to a close, on behalf of those who praise injustice.
Analysis of Glaucon's Challenge
The introductory three-fold division of goods contains several points that Plato
will unpack in his defense. Perhaps its most salient feature is the relation posited
between the taxonomy of goods and happiness. The reader familiar with Aristotle's
hierarchy of ends may have been surprised to find that Socrates claims priority for the
third category of goods, that justice is valued not only for its own sake, but also for its
externally derived consequences. Aristotle would place his highest good, happiness, in
the first, since it is chosen for itself, but not for the sake of anything else (NE 1094a18
ff. ).136 And indeed Socrates will expend the bulk of his effort arguing that justice is to be
136 See also n. 2, supra. Vlastos (1991, 108) christens this the Eudaimonist Axiom, everywhere assumed
but nowhere argued: 'Happiness is desired by all human beings as the ultimate end of all their rational
acts.' Devereux (2004) challenges the prevailing consensus that Plato is an eudaimonist; but it is difficult
70
desired in itself,137 since most people already grant that it is also desired for its external
consequences. Yet it may seem particularly odd that happiness itself does not appear in
the highest category. Is this not, after all, the greatest good, the prize after which justice
and injustice are vying? True enough; but the reason for its absence is that happiness
stands beyond the three-fold division, toward which all other goods incline. 138 This is
indicated (albeit without much clarity) by Socrates when he says, 'I suppose that Oustice]
belongs in the finest class, which must be loved by one who would be happy, both on
account of itself, and on account the things that come from it.' 139
From this comment of Socrates we may also discern an implicit hierarchy of
goods. The third class Socrates marks as the finest; it also is singled out as especially
relevant for attaining happiness, although which class (or subset of a class) contributes
to see how his position can make sense ofthe central challenge ofthe Republic, namely, to show that
justice promotes our happiness better than injustice.
137 In the sense specified on p. 64 supra, which includes consequences that derive from its own power, as
opposed to chose derived from the approbrium or disapproval of others.
138 Thus Irwin (1999, 165): 'The threefold division presupposes the supremacy of happiness, and the
subordination of all three classes of goods to happiness, since they are all chosen for the sake of happiness.'
For Plato, as for Aristotle and later Hellenistic thinkers, there is no real tension between choosing virtue
both for itself and for the sake of happiness, and need not imply a psychological egoism. See Annas (1993,
127 ff.) for a discussion of this point.
139 'EYW jjEll ol},lal, i7v 6' ryw, Ell rc;J /CillfaTCf). 0 /Co.) 61' aUro /Co.) 61a ra ylyv6w:va chr' aUroli irya7r'lrEoV rc;J
jjEMOVrt jja/CapfCf) E(7caBal (358al-3). Precisely what kind of relationship Socrates is positing between
justice and happiness has been the topic of much wrangling. The two main camps are (1) those claiming
that the relationship is causal (e.g., White 1984, Sachs 1963), and (2) those maintaining that justice is the
most important part of happiness, a dominant good that may not be alone sufficient for happiness, but that
at least makes just people happier than unjust (e.g., Irwin 1999, Kirwain 1965). I have adopted the latter
characterization of goods as parts of happiness, though on both accounts, happiness in some way is the
consequence ofjustice. For further discussion of this relationship, see pp. 86 ff., infra. See also Vlastos
(1991,109).
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most to happiness is precisely what is at issue. 140 This is significant because it amounts
to a denial of Nussbaum's assumption that there is no class of goods that has an even
primajacie priority in determining one's happiness. 141 Moreover, he is offering
happiness itself as the criterion for determining priority (since everyone desires happiness
most of all); whatever contributes most to it ought to be privileged. Note that the
taxonomy is not a distinction between moral and non-moral goods; Plato is not illicitly
trading off any presumption ofprecedence for justice, because it is a moral good, in
making his case. 142 In this respect, Plato is accepting the challenge to show that, even if
one's interest is the only consideration, that agent still has reason to choose justice over
injustice, as the best way to secure happiness. His anwer is, then, equally relevant to the
case of Herodotus' Gyges, whose misconstrual of interest led to his unjust action. Of
course Socrates still has to make his case; how he goes about arguing to this conclusion is
the topic of the next chapter.
Glaucon's first thought experiment, that of Gyges and his ring, naturally seeks
points of contact with its Herodotean predecessor. 143 And indeed it seems to have
140 Glaucon cites wisdom, sight, and health as other goods of this class, though there are certainly others
(357c2-4).
141 See pp. 35 ff., supra. Happiness, again, is not simply a subjective emotional state, but rather represents
the best life, the most flourishing life, available for a human being.
142 Even though Socrates himselfbelieves this, and many people would grant it; he wants to make an
argument that even Thrasymachus would not be able to dismiss, and so uses premises recognized by all.
143 Williams (2006a, 100-1) objects to this counterfactual on two grounds: (1) it is not very plausible, as
'the motivations ofjustice will be sufficiently internalized not to evaporate instantaneously if the agent
discovers inVisibility;' (2) it is not clear how relevant this thought experiement is to real life; it is merely
comparing reality with fantasy. Both of these objections can be met. As to (1), there is nothing that
prevents the decline into immorality to occur over time. Moreover, it is not difficult to imagine a person
--------_._-----
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features in common with Gyges' first dilemma in Herodotus. Each Gyges is presented
with a choice to do either what he believes right or what he believes wrong. Both choose
the latter course, but only once certain inhibiting adverse consequences are removed.
Plato places special emphasis on the freedom of choice because it clarifies the desires and
motivations of the agent. In the case of Herodotus' Gyges, as we have seen, his first
dilemma was not nearly so oppressed by necessity as he thought; he chose with relative
freedom what he thought was in his best overall interest, though reluctant even to the end
to abandon principle. The duress that Herodotus' Gyges faced disappears with the
introduction of the ring, as Plato recognizes that fear or other intense emotions can cloud
an ordinary agent's moral deliberations, and so may have muddied (Herodotus') Gyges'
motivations. 144 Yet in both cases, the injustice seems to have brought rewards sufficient
to justify their actions.
Now there are some apparent differences between the two Gyges. Plato's version
is an unapologetic opportunist, who exhibits no qualms with pursuing iJ1iustice, while
Herodotus' is a basically decent moral agent. The fact that Herodotus' Gyges chose as he
did in the first dilemma does not entail that he does not care at all about justice in its oWfl
right. If this is right, then even though each Gyges chose injustice on the basis of
consequence, it does not follow (contrary to Glaucon's claim) that anyone acting in a
that is always looking to gain his or her own advantage, to 'milk the system' as we might say, for whom the
plunge would be nearly instantaneous (ef. the Herodotus quote at the head of this chapter). As to (2), the
counterfactual is relevant because it clarifies the agent's desires that are more obscure in daily life. We all
can construct plaubible scenarios wherein an agent can exploit an almost certain freedom from detection.
Calling it 'fantasy' is not particularly relevant; many of the thought experiments in, for example, physics,
proceed on premises that are equally unrooted in reality as we know it (e.g., 'Imagine you are in a space
ship in the Andromeda Galaxy traveling at light speed...). It does not follow that nothing useful can be
inferred from them on this basis.
144 Plato's moral psychology will be discussed in the next chapter.
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similar manner values justice only as an instrumental good. But it does suggest that
considering the whole range of one's values, justice is only one commitment among
many, and so may reasonably be swept aside in order to achieve one's best overall good.
The second thought experiment, the Choice of Lives, brings out this point even
more clearly. Again, it may be read with the Herodotus account, but here as a resetting of
Gyges' second dilemma, expanded from one fearsome tragic moment to a way oflife.
Again the artificial confines of the tragic motif are abandoned since dread necessity
potentially confuses the issue of choice. In both the Choice of Lives and Gyges' second
dilemma, the choice is between justice on the one hand, and the most important (non-
moral) goods on the other. At the end of the Choice of Lives, Glaucon catalogues many
of the goods that the completely unjust man acquires: power, riches, an illustrious wife,
for starters. 145 Were these not precisely the goods that Herodotus' Gyges gained?
But more than this, Glaucon catalogues those goods conventionally attached to
justice, and for which reason most people value justice, but now as won through injustice:
the ability to help friends and harm enemies (Polemarchus' account ofjustice), winning
favor of the gods through sacrifices and offerings (cf. Herodotus' Gyges and Cephalus),
and the approval and friendship of men. 146 In short, in view of the whole range of human
values-relationships, material goods, securing divine favor-these all can be achieved
through perfect injustice. So, what possible reason is there to be just? Only an unjust
145 See quotation pp. 68-69, supra.
146 Though not discussed earlier, one of the benefits of justice that Polemarchus suggests is in partnerships
and associations (333b-c); here too, the unjust man comes out ahead.
death awaits the just man. 147 Who, then, would think it better, even on reflection, to
suffer than to commit injustice?
147 No doubt Plato has Socrates' own fate in mind.
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CHAPTER VI
PLATO'S DEFENSE OF mSTICE
J7fJ-lv b', hrezbr] 6 A6yO~ orJrOJ~ afpel, fJ-r] ouMv aAAO (JKelITEOV ij... TrOrepov MKaza
Trpar;OfJ-ev... ij TIl aA"7Befr;r abZKJ7(JOfJ-ev Travm muw TrOlOrJvTG~'Kav rpazvwfJ-eBa abZKa aUra
Epya(OfJ-evoz, fJ-r] oubiTJ lnroAoyf(e(JBaz oUr' ef CxTroBvrj(J1(ezv &i: ..oUre aUo arlOrJv Tra(Jxezv
TrPO TOU abzKelv.
But for us, since the argument thus constrains us, we must look to nothing other
than...whether we shall actjustly...or, in truth, we shall be acting unjustly in doing all
these things; and if it appears, in doing them, that these things are unjust, then we should
not take any account of whether I should die...or should suffer anything else whatsoever,
when the alternative is acting unjustly.
(Socrates in Crito 48c6-d5)
Plato's response to Glaucon's challenge (and by extension, to Herodotus' Gyges),
to demonstrate that the just man is happier than the unjust, is first articulated not as an
argument but as an analogy: justice is to the soul what health is to the body.148 If this is
granted, then the further question of whether it is better to be just or unjust, is, as Glaucon
remarks, ridiculous (445a5-b4). For if the body is ruined, then all the delights that attend
it are meaningless; so too for the soul, if it is corrupted by injustice, what real profit
would Gyges derive from his ring? This analogy, taken alone, manifestly begs the
question. Thrasymachus would certainly not grant it, as Plato is well aware. In order to
fill out this glimpse of an answer, and determine the strength of its fully-elaborated form,
we need to consider (1) Plato's account of the nature ofjustice, (2) its relation to his
148 '[Just and unjust actions] are not at all different for the soul than heathy and diseased things are for the
body' (444c6-7). And again: 'Virtue, then, as it seems, would be a kind of health, beauty, and vigorous
state of the soul, while vice is sickness, ugliness, and weakness' (444dI2). For an earlier appearance ofthis
analogy, see Crito 47e6 ff.
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underlying moral psychology, (3) how justice fits into the overall scheme of goods
relative to happiness, and (4) how reason, and in particular philosophy, is essential to the
just agent's happiness. 149
Justice
The analogy with health turns on the assumption that the soul, like the body, is
composed of parts which, if properly arranged, attain a harmony of purpose and function,
and constitute a unity that reflects its optimal condition. 150 The soul is found to have
three parts: the reasoning part (roAoyurW(ov), the appetitive part (ro E7rZ(JVj1'lTlKOV), by
which the soul 'loves, hungers, thirsts, and flutters over the other desires,' and the spirited
part (ro (Jvj1oez6Ec;), by which the soul feels righteous indignation (439d4 ff.).151 By
nature each of these parts has its own proper function; and justice, it turns out, is nothing
h h h " - , 'd" ,152ot er t an eac part ra mvTOU 7f:pa:rrelV, omg Its own.
The essential nature ofjustice, then, is 'doing one's own,' but attaches properly to
an internal, not external, state of affairs:
149 This paper will not examine the arguments presented in book nine (580d ff.) to prove that justice is also
more pleasant than injustice, as this further question is, strictly speaking, extraneous to the central question
of happiness. They are likely offered as further proofs against those who misjudge the good to be pleasure
(505b-c), intended to show that, even by their own criterion of pleasure, the just life turns out to be better
than the unjust life.
150 A more detailed analysis of this assumption follows in the next section, but a proleptic synopsis of
certain aspects will render Plato's account ofjustice more intelligible.
151 The modem reader need not be concerned over antiquated notions of souls and their parts; in more
contemporary vernacular, one could replace 'soul' with 'psyche;' Freud, too, would divide his psyche into
parts, though they do not neatly align with Plato's division.
152 'We must remember, then, that each of us in whom each part performs its own [function], that man will
be just and will mind his own affairs [ra auwlinpmrelv]' (441dll-el). The same account ofjustice was
applied earlier to the ideal just city (432b ff.), but it is explicitly stated that the moral properties belong
primarily to individuals, and only derivatively applied to cities (43 5e).
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Justice.. .is not [primarily] concerned with the doing of one's own externally, but
with doing his own within and with what is truly himself and his own; one who
does not suffer each part in his soul to do each the work of another or allow the
different kinds in him to meddle with one another, but arranges well what is truly
his own. He rules and orders himself and is his own friend, harmonizing the three
elements in him...and from many he becomes one, moderate and properly attuned.
Thus harmonized, only at this point, does he act (443clO-e3).
In revealing justice a feature of souls, first and foremost, Plato's ethics may be
understood as agent-centered, and not act-centered. 153 Actions are not irrelevant,
though, since they may promote and preserve ajust (or, indeed, an unjust) state of the
soul (443e6-7). Yet a single just act, or unconnected assortment of such acts, naturally
cannot a just person make. 154 One's character is the stable disposition to act in certain
ways, as reflected in habits developed over the course of life.
Now this internal conception ofjustice is unconventional. As we have seen,
traditional justice is concerned with actions. But if one interprets 'doing one's own' as
equivalent to performing certain actions, it is clear that for any given action, it is possible
to perform it without having a corresponding inner harmony. Any such act, however just
it may seem, may be done with unjust motives. Although Plato needs to elucidate
precisely why this internal harmony matters, it does not seem wholly implausible. Even a
marginally reflective person believes that motives matter; to take two commonplace
153 There is broad agreement on this point, e.g., Annas (1981, 20-22), Mabbot (1937, 474), and Vlastos
(1971a, 67). According to an agent-centered ethics, the key question is 'what kind of character does the
moral agent have?;' whereas to an act-centered theory the question is 'what kind of action is it?' On the
former account, just actions are the kinds of action just agents would do; on the latter, agents are just
becasue their actions are just.
154 Vlastos (67, n. 6): 'that any just act, or arbitrarily selected set of just acts, must "pay" would be patently
false (except perhaps for an egoistic utilitarian who might so defme 'just act' as to make it true); and that
Plato would think it false is distinctly implied in the Republic, e.g., in the portrait of the 'oligarchic' man
(553e ff.): though unjust (he defrauds orphans), this man has a fme reputation for justice in his business; so
there would be stretches of his life during which he performs only just acts, and ifjust acts per se made one
happy he would have stretches ofhappiness; but Plato pictures him as never happy (554c-d).'
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examples, a gift given with dubious motives is received with suspicion, not gratitude;
similarly, someone may perform ajust action only from fear of getting caught
committing injustice. In addition, as we have seen, expiatory acts ofjustice prescribed by
traditional Greek morality serve as a better measure of a person's wealth than his or her
character.
But this is not to deny that there are significant points of contact between
conventional and Platonic (internal) justice: Plato thinks that an internally just agent in
fact performs many acts that are conventionally just. He applies cases commonly agreed
to be instances of unjust action to see whether or not his internally just man would act in
this way, and with Glaucon's assent finds that he would refrain from such actions (442e-
443a). Some scholars have inferred that Plato believes that if an action is Platonically
just, then it will also be conventionally juSt. 155
What about the converse of this conditional-if an action is conventionally just
will it also be Platonically just? Certainly Plato would reject this, and with good reason.
The dialogues are littered with conventional moral agents whose moral beliefs are
inconsistent, and so at least in part false. But this lack of co-extensionality has led some
to cry foul. It has been claimed that Plato has agreed to demonstrate that an agent is
better offifhe or she is conventionally just, but goes on to show that he or she is better
off if Platonically juSt. 156 In other words, Plato commits the fallacy of irrelevancy
155 Sachs (1963, 46) and his followers think Plato maintains this. Yet while Socrates and Glaucon consider
a range of cases in which this obtains, it seems doubtful that Plato would endorse this conditional. For if
conventional justice harbors mistaken assumptions, such as that it is just not to harm one's enemies, then if
it is Platonically just not to harm one's enemies, the conditional is false.
156 Sachs ignited this controversy; see Dahl (1991) for a more recent treatment of this question.
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because he changes the subject. On this objection, Plato's answer is relevant only if both
a Platonically just person is also conventionally just, and a conventionally just person is
Platonically just.
This objection, though intelligible, is puzzling. For if the range ofjust actions
must be co-extensive for Platonic and conventional justice, then Socrates' entire mission
becomes obscure: he was not exhorting his fellow Athenians simply to follow
conventional justice, questioning only whether their individual actions are truly cases of
conventional justice; rather, he tried to get them to examine and clarify their conventional
beliefs about justice in a way that better captures what it means to be virtuous. But even
if one concedes that the objection has some force, Plato cannot be accused of simply
pulling a 'bait and switch.' In posing his challenge to Socrates, Glaucon clearly states
that most people believe that justice in an instrumental, that is, an external good; he wants
Socrates also to show that it is a good in itself, by its own power in the soul-that is, that
it is an internal good (358b). So ifthere is a fallacy here, it is not surreptitiously slipped
into the answer, but follows from how the issue is framed.
The objection of irrelevancy can be met if Plato's theory ofjustice is taken as
explanatory of certain features of conventional justice.157 The breakdown of psychic
harmony is taken to explain some forms of commonly recognized unjust behavior (590a6
ff.), to show how and why the agent has gone wrong. Moreover, an internal conception
157 Pace Annas (1981,161-63). See also Vlastos (l971a) who addresses this objection by arguing that
Plato endeavors to prove that in fact having a harmonious soul is what being a just man means. 'What a
man does is for Plato only an 'image' of what he is; his 'external' conduct is only a manifestation of his
'inner' life, which is the life of the 'real' man, the soul; and since he thinks that a definition ofF as a
statement of what F 'really is,' he could only count the psychological formula as the true definition of an
individual's justice.' (82)
80
ofjustice provides the mechanism by which the just person is happier than the unjust-
the true quarry of the investigation-a mechanism which conventional justice, as we have
seen, can only weakly and contingently provide. 158 But these issues are best treated in
the following section.
Before turning to Plato's moral psychology, though, let us review Plato's answer
thus far. The bald outline of his answer, the justification of which is still to corne, is that
justice produces a psychic harmony in the soul akin to health in the body. This justice,
moreover, is consists of each part of the soul 'doing its own.' Now it is curious how
similar this formulation ofjustice is to the earlier accounts of how one should act,
whether or not they were specifically articulated as definitions ofjustice. Recall that
Herodotus' Gyges appeals to the principle of 'looking to one's own' as a principle of
right conduct; for Cephalus, justice is looking to one's own affairs, to ensure due
payment is made for any wrong committed, either to a god or man; for Polemarchus,
justice means looking to one's own in terms of helping one's friends; and finally, for
Thrasymachus, who did not consider justice a good at all, nevertheless espoused a
principle oflooking to one's own, by which he means looking to one's own interests to
the extent that one's strength or stealth can procure them. The point here is not simply
that 'looking to one's own' is a rather malleable idea, but that moral agents can possess
roughly the right principle, but unless they truly appreciate its meaning, they can go
catastrophically wrong in their moral deliberations and actions. Getting it right involves
more than the right disposition or right upbringing, or even being able to cite a sound
158 Since, as Glaucon's challenge shows, injustice (under certain conditions) is consistent with those
advantages conventionally attached to justice.
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moral principle; for Plato, it requires possession of the kind of knowledge that only
philosophy can provide.
Plato's Moral Psychology
Unpacking Plato's metaphor of psychic harmony will show why he thinks his
analogy with bodily health is legitimate. To do this, a clearer understanding of each of
the soul's parts and their proper relation to one another is necessary. Conversely, once
the structure of this harmony is explained, it will be possible to see how the breakdown of
psychological harmony results in injustice and wrongdoing in general.
Plato's division of the soul into three parts amounts to the theory that there are
three irreducible determinants of choice and action. 159 Each part not only has its own
function, but also its own corresponding desires and ability to motivate (580d). But let us
take each part in tum. The rational part's function is twofold: to seek out and learn the
truth and to rule the other parts of the soul (441e3-5, 442c4-7). Now to these functions
there attaches the desire for truth and wisdom, and so this part is called a 'lover of
learning' and 'lover of wisdom' (581b6-11). The spirited part, whose function is
righteous anger, is a natural ally of the reasoning part in keeping the soul's appetites in
check, and serves as the prick of conscience when one falls into wrongdoing (43ge-441 c).
159 Plato's argument for the three parts proceeds from an application of the principle of non-contradiction;
having identified three basic functions (learning, feeling rightous anger, desiring pleasures and other
appetities), and having posited that one may feel attraction and repulsion to the same object, he states 'it is
clear that the same thing will be unable do or suffer opposites [rdvavrfa] in the same respect and with
regard to the same thing at the same time, so that if we ever fmd this come to pass in the soul, we shall
know that it was not the same function but a plurality' (436b9-c2). Plato himself proceeds with this division
as a hypothesis, suggesting that if it proves false, then whatever depends on it will need to be rethought
(437a). Cooper (1984) argues convincingly that Plato's tri-partite soul captures many facts about our
psychological makeup that later theories (including Aristotle's two-part division) do not. I shall focus on
the rational and appetitive parts, however, as these are most relevant to our purposes.
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This part strains after honor and competitive victory, as is thus called 'honor loving' and
'victory loving' (581a9-bl); in modem terms, this part is related to our sense of self-
esteem. 160 The appetitive part is less sharply defined, but contains all those appetites that
pertain to the pleasures of the body, both natural and harmful, and whatever accompanies
these. 161 'Money loving' this part is called, because money is the chief means by which
such appetites are satisfied (580e5-58Ial).162
Given these three parts, then, why should reason rule? Moreover, is not the rule
of reason compatible with Glaucon's completely unjust man, who cleverly perpetrates
injustice like a master craftsman? Even Thrasymachus would embrace such a "justice."
As to the first question, owing to its desire for knowledge and wisdom, reason is the only
part which knows 'what is advantageous for each and for the whole, which is the
community of the three' (442c4-7). The other two parts desire each its own objects, but
without any regard for the others, or to what is best for the person as a whole. It is easy
to imagine how an intense desire for victory, say, or certain pleasures, if pursued
doggedly without any concern for one's other values and commitments, could be
eminently self-destructive. Further, the reasoning part makes this determination based, at
160 Thus Cooper (1984, 135), who also notes that this part of the soul is particularly dependent upon the
contingencies ofour upbringing and life experiences.
161 'But the third part, on account of its many forms, we could not designate by one name proper to it, but
that which is biggest and strongest in it, by this we name it: we have called it the appetitive part on
account of the intensity of its desires concerning food and drink and sex and all such things that go with
them' (580dlO-e5).
162 This designation has led Annas (1981, 130) to suggest that the appetitive part can also reason
independently, at least in a limited means-ends way: it desires money because it is an instrument by which
appetites may be satisfied. But it is possible, strictly speaking, for it to desire money simply because it is
reliably associated with the desired pleasures. If one thinks of some of the behavioral studies done in the
mid-twentieth century, it is clear that (in Humean terms) the constant conjunction of money with the
satisfaction of desires may lead to the extension of desire from the object to that which usually
accompanies it.
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least in part, on its intuition of the good (505e). Of course different people will intuit this
more or less clearly, but Plato believes that this desire for the good is built into human
nature. 163 Now as to the second question, the answer is related to the first. In the soul of
the unjust person, however clever, reason is simply a passive, instrumental faculty,
merely sorting out how to best achieve the wishes and desires of the other parts of the
soul. He may seek to organize his entire life around such pleasures, but this stunts his
rational pursuit for truth, and jeopardizes his connection to reality, which compromises
his overall well-being. l64
Reason, when it rules, strives to organize one's life as a whole, in a way that does
not simply repress the soul's other components. Anticipating Freud, Plato suggests that
one whose soul is thus in disarray finds their dreams populated with repressed longings,
perpetrating in sleep what they desire but dare not do in waking (571c-d). This is not to
say that Plato countenances every appetite. He distinguishes between so-called necessary
and unnecessary appetites (558d-559b); while we would likely conceive these categories
less ascetically than Plato, the point here is that Plato does not debase appetite per se;
each part of the soul is essential and integral to the whole human being. 165
163 '[The Good is] that which every soul, without exception, pursues and for the sake of which it acts,
having some intuition of its reality, but being at a loss and not having a sufficient grasp of what on earth it
is' (505el-3).
164 How this is so will be considered momentarily.
165 This conclusion follows from the formal elements of the harmonized soul as presented in book four, and
augmented from books eight and nine. To be sure, there are passages-especially elsewhere, such as the
Phaedo, but even in the Republic-that seem to give no value to appetites of any kind. But the view of the
harmonious soul in Repubic book four clearly accommodates them, even if in a limited and subsidiary role.
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Perhaps Plato should get the last word on this topic. In book nine (588c ff.) he imagines
the soul like some mythological beast, in the composite form of a man and lion, but also
with a ring of other heads, some savage and others tame; these correspond to the rational,
spirited, and appetitive parts, respectively. Now the just man, he continues, is like a
farmer, 'training and nurturing the tame heads, but hindering the growth of the wild ones,
and making an ally of the lion's nature, and caring for all of them in common, having
made them friendly to one another and to himself, he will thus enable them all to thrive'
(589b2-6).
But of course it is often the case that this psychic harmony is not maintained or
ever achieved. As Aristotle says about virtue generally, there is only one way to hit the
mark, but many ways to go wrong. In books eight and nine, Plato gives four accounts of
the progressive moral degeneration of individuals, the rational structure of whose souls
breaks down. 166 The upshot of these models is that when reason, with its interest in truth
and reality, is subsumed to the ends of the other parts, the individual (as part of that
reality) loses-to his or her detriment-important contact with the way the world really
is. Now it is not difficult to imagine how a life without any governing rational principle,
whether of an instrumental quality or not, would be constantly frustrated by forces
outside his or her control. But this does not address the challenge of Glaucon's
166 The account given here will connect only loosely to Plato's. His account is determined, to an
unfortunate degree, by his correlate degenerate states from the ideal state. The extended analogy becomes
very tenuous indeed, becoming forced and charicature-like at points. But Plato gives enough indications to
make a case for his general point independent of his political analogy. This territory has already been
explored by Annas (2005); I will partly follow her insightful treatment.
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completely unjust man, as to why his reason, being dominated by one or both of the non-
rational parts, fails to deliver a well-rounded, good life.
Let us consider an example of how a person may suffer from an inadequate
connection with the way things are. The following is adapted from Annas (2005, 4), and
corresponds to what Plato would consider the predominance ofthe 'honor loving' part,
though a parallel example could be drawn for one governed by his or her appetites.
Imagine a brilliant young scholar who enters academia with a desire for understanding in
his particular discipline. Soon enough, he has developed a theory that he believes is true,
and resolves many of the outstanding difficulties in the field. For a while, his theory
enthralls his peers, but eventually a new generation of clever scholars brings serious and
valid objections to the theory. Our scholar now becomes protective of his theory, and
strains to show either that the objections are mistaken, or that his theory can actually
accommodate them. As the debate intensifies, the scholar becomes more deeply
entrenched, and considers other theories only as they relate to his own. To the end, our
scholar defends his paper citadel against all volleys and siege engines, and ultimately
congratulates himself in never having had to retract his theory.
Now this example shows a certain degeneration of our scholar that may be
recognized as one kind of failure of reason. Our scholar has become increasingly narrow
in his scope of rationality: at first, he desired only the expansive horizons of truth, but
later, clouded by his desire for prestige, his gaze narrowly focuses on himself, on the
maintenance of his own theory. Fair criticisms become malicious positions to attack; the
more importance our scholar invests in his own theory, rather than in the truth, the more
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he becomes blinded to other alternatives (Annas, 4_5).167 It is plain that our scholar is
reasoning poorly. But this is not a failure in instrumental reason; if anything, the very
success of instrumental reasoning cripples our scholar's overall rationality. In this case,
subsuming reason to reputation yields a certain myopic self-delusion, unable to see how
his vanity actually interferes with other commitments and values that he holds. 168
From this case, it is possible to see the limitations of a purely instrumental
rationality. Assuming that an agent cares about more than one thing (the best life is
agreed to countenance a range of values), the constriction of focus sacrifices other values
the agent holds dear. If the rational part does not maintain vigilance over the whole range
of values, then it actually makes the agent more vulnerable to external contingencies.
One blinkered by the singular craving for, say, honor, or pleasure, or any of a number of
ends not harmoniously integrated by reason, loses sight of other values, obliviously
exposing them to otherwise preventable risks. Few would grant that such a single-
minded purpose could produce the best overall life; this kind of unity only impoverishes
one's well-being. Even if our scholar's theory had remained preeminent, and so too his
honor, we still feel as though he has sacrificed something valuable along the way.
Justice, then, as the harmonious organization of one's overall good, confers a benefit to
the whole person.
167 This kind of hardening in his pride is an example of what Plato says at 485d6-8, 'But for whomever the
desires incline vehemently to some one thing, we know, I suppose, that they are weakened for other things,
just like a stream diverted to another channel.' Such strengthened desired become more difficult to resist
the more they are satisfied, and are likely to influence an agent's conception of his or her good.
168 Socrates, on the other hand, exhibiting an honesty that few are courageous enough to embrace, sought
out refutation, on the belief that it would make him a better person by purging error from his soul (e.g.,
336e-337a, d).
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Justice as a Good
Assuming that the value ofjustice, of the life governed by the rational element,
has been made sufficiently clear, how are we to rate its possession relative to other, non-
moral goods in attaining happiness? It bears repeating that Plato does recognize the value
of other goods, regardless of the occasional moral fervor of his rhetoric that seems to
point to the contrary. Other values are implied in the very nature of the tri-partite soul.
The non-rational components each have their proper non-moral objects, whose
possession, under the watchful direction of reason, must be admitted to count as goodS. 169
Now if there are other, non-moral goods that are related to the non-rational parts
of the soul, then it seems that happiness must consist in more than virtue alone.
Moreover, it suggests that, due to the needs of these other parts of the soul, which are
bound inextricably to external contingencies, there is an irreducible element of
vulnerability to happiness, even for the most virtuous agent. If this is so, then justice
cannot be sufficient for happiness. Ifwe think back on Glaucon's Choice of Lives, the
perfectly just man is deprived of all normal benefits accruing to justice, and hounded
unfairly even unto torture and death. Surely such a man is not happy. 170 But this does
169 Cf. Euthydemus 279a-b, where a number of non-moral goods are entertained. In our example of the
scholar, the difficulty is not that honor is not a good-Plato would recognize that it is; the problem is the
bloated role that honor is given relative to other values in his life. When, at 495a7, Plato refers to wealth
and other 'so-called goods,' he is not denying that they are goods, but only that they are not unqualifiedly
so: there may be circumstances when in fact they are not beneficial, as a good must be.
170 Cf. Aristotle,NE 1153bI9-21: 'Thus those who say that, if a man is good, he is happy when being
tortured and having fallen into the greatest misfortunes, either willingly or unwillingly are speaking
nonsense.' Burnet thinks the Cynics are likely the target of this comment, but it applies equally here.
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not yet settle the comparative question--our question-as to whether such a person is
happier than his unjust counterpart possessed of all other goods.
In order for that to obtain, justice would have to be a good of such magnitude that
its presence in the soul of its possessor is greater than any other combination of goods, if
these are accompanied by injustice. 171 Justice, then, for Plato, is a dominant good, such
that 'being just guarantees by itself that just people will be happier than any unjust
people, even if the just people are not happy, and even if all the goods that are distinct
from justice belong to unjust people.'172 Now Plato thinks that he has given us reason to
suppose that this is so, given the kind of psychic health that the soul fosters. Justice is a
good that arranges other goods such that they all can be enjoyed harmoniously, in a way
that insures the pursuit of any other particular good does not impinge on the pursuit and
enjoyment of other legitimate goodS. 173 Conversely, as we have seen, the absence of this
internal harmony prohibits the agent to enjoy fully the range the goods that he or she does
possess. 174
This, then, is Plato's answer to Glaucon's challenge. Having elaborated the role
ofjustice in the psyche, and having shown the inner instability of one who lacks this
171 'But what each of them is in itself, by its own power when present in the soul of its possessor and when
its presence escapes both gods and men, no one has sufficiently argued...that [injustice] is the greatest of
evils which the soul contains, and that justice is its greatest good' (366e5-367a1).
172 Thus Irwin (1999, 176); cf. Vlastos' (1971 a, 1991) their positions reflect a general agreement on Plato's
view on the kind ofgood justice must be.
173 Plato summarizes this thought in a turn of phrase than anticipates Aristotle's account of virtue (NE
1104a11 ff.): '[the just man] always knows how to choose the life [situated] in the mean and to escape the
excesses on either side... for in this way does a man become most happy' (619a5-b1).
174 This view turns out to approximate that of Cephalus in Republic 1, who maintains that wealth is useful
only to one of good character (see p. 42, supra.). Plato often comments (e.g., Statesman 277d) that
ordinal)' moral agents often know (loosely speaking) a thing in a way, but only as 'through a glass, darkly.'
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harmony and unity, his introductory analogy ofjustice to health is made clear. Glaucon,
at any rate, is completely satisfied with this account, and pronounces the fully just agent
happier than any of his rivals (580b-c). But if this holds for such an extreme
counterfactual as presented in the Choice of Lives, then under the normal conditions of
life, where the externally conferred benefits ofjustice accrue, the just man is a fortiori far
better off than the unjust man, whose internal dissention is further compounded by fears
of detection and punishment.
Likewise, we are in a position now to see how Plato would answer the challenge
of the 'tragic' viewpoint, as set forth by Nussbaum. 175 Part of her claim is that Plato, in
his attempt to make life invulnerable to fortune, sequesters happiness to the austere realm
of reason. In this way, her contention holds, Plato sacrifices much of what we would
rightly deem part of the good life. Now it is clear that, at least in his account of the
structure and proper arrangement of the soul in Republic book four, Plato in fact not only
recognizes such vulnerability as an ineradicable aspect of human life, he also embraces it.
Nor is this characterization empty hyperbole. It follows from his view ofjustice. If
justice is the greatest good a person can possess short of happiness, and justice is the
proper arrangement of the soul, each part 'doing its own,' then-since the soul is not only
rationality-the health of the non-rational parts of the soul (whose objects are vulnerable
to fortune) are an essential part of Plato's dominant good. And since justice contributes
most of all to happiness, these elements factor into one's overall well-being, as part of
175 See pp. 34 ff., supra.
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this greatest of goodS. 176 Moreover, Plato has demonstrated, even in terms limited to
interest, that there is good reason to privilege justice over other goods in considering
one's life as a whole. Part of being just, as it turns out, is looking at one's life as a whole,
to determine how best to flourish as a human being. The opposition of interest and
justice, then, is a false one.
Much of the response to Glaucon and Nussbaum apply equally to the challenge of
Herodotus' Gyges. One more element is required, though, before Plato's full response
can be weighed. We need an understanding of the role of philosophy in securing the
good life.
The Just Man and the Philosopher
Many seem to me to fall into [contradiction] even against their wills, and suppose not that
they are wrangling [Ep{(clV], but arguing, on account of not being able to examine what
has been said by dividing it in accordance with the Forms.
(Republic 454a4-6)
We have seen how a moral agent can jeopardize his or her overall good when one
of the non-rational elements predominates in the soul. Excessive desire for honor or
pleasure, for example, can distort one's priorities and pursuits. But there is another way
for a moral agent to go wrong: he or she can make an intellectual mistake. A person's
appetites and desires may be properly under the guidance of reason, but reason itself may
err. Plato thinks that everyone desires the good, but clearly--even among those in whom
176 I suspect (if! may conjecture) that Nussbaum does not give Plato's analysis ofthe soul proper
consideration because she is concerned to fit the Republic into a larger arc of development both within
Plato's works, and as a part of a teleological narrative ending at Aristotle.
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reason is supreme-there are differences in opinion. 177 Variations in people's native
intelligence and training (to name but two factors) are likely to lead to different
conclusions about what is good. Consider Herodotus' Gyges: he appears to have
properly ordered priorities and desires, but he nevertheless makes mistakes in his moral
deliberations that could easily have led to catastrophic results. What is needed, then, is
some science or body of knowledge that can reliably assist the moral agent in his or her
deliberations. What is needed, in short, is philosophy.
Plato lavishes great care on the education of his ideal philosopher, whose rigorous
training is measured in decades rather than years (374e ff., 521-25).178 Philosophy,
naturally, works upon the rational part of the soul, which was called 'wisdom loving'
(581b6-11). The ideal philosopher is one who has knowledge of the Forms, the eternal
and unchanging essential natures that make particular things to be of a kind (484b,
596a).179 Now to possess this knowledge, of course, entails that one cannot be mistaken;
177 See n. 163, supra. The masses usually misconstrue pleasure for the Good (SOSb).
178 In part this is because they are the rulers in his ideal city, which we do not consider here. Plato's dim
view of the intellectual capacity of most people is not essential to his characterization of the philosopher or
his defense ofjustice. We may, then, charitably leave the set of philosophers underdetermined, to include
whoever proves capable of the kind of thought described. Plato thinks the perfect philosopher 'appears but
rarely among men and are few' (491bl-2). His perfect philosopher, like his perfect city, is an ideal, and the
former is largely a product of the latter. But he also recognizes philosophers live in imperfect and even
corrupt cities, where their value is not generally recognized, and where 'he keeps quiet and minds his own
affairs [riwUroi7/rpc:melv], as such a one in a storm of dust and spray driven by the wind stands beneath a
wall, [the philosoher,] seeing others filled with delight oflawlessness, is satisfied if perchance he himself
will be able to live a life here free from doing injustice and impiety, and depart from it with fair hope,
gentle and well-disposed' (496d6-e3).
179 For example, for the set of all beautiful things, there corresponds some single nature of Beauty itself, by
which the multiplicity all beautiful things are beautiful. The ability to rise from particulars to the Form is
the major point that divides philosophers from non-philosophers.
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if one is mistaken, then it is not knowledge that one possesses, but opinion. 180 These
stable natures are also the objects of elenctic argument, which seeks answers to the 'what
is Xl' question discussed earlier. Knowledge of the Forms is important in part because
knowledge of what it is to be just, or temperate, or brave, or any of a number of things,
requires knowledge of what justice, temperance, bravery, etc., essentially is. 181
Moreover, a complete understanding includes knowledge ofthe Form of the Good, 'by
reference to which just things and the others become useful and beneficial' (505a3-4).
But Socrates' own account of the Good is thin and suffused with metaphor, and in fact he
admits having an inadequate knowledge of it (505a4-6); it is sufficient for our purposes to
indicate that the ideal philosopher will have knowledge of this as well (506d ff.).
So if a just person, whose soul is governed by the 'wisdom loving' part, further
undertakes training in philosophy, to gain knowledge of the Forms, and so reliably hits
upon what is truly good, then, Plato thinks, the just agent can deliberate without fear of
error. The philosopher's soul exhibits the perfect manifestation of what it means for the
180 Plato divides knowledge from opinion even more strongly (and, one might add, dubiously): according
to 477b-478a, knowledge and opinion correspond to different mental faculties, and so also different objects.
Part of the reason Plato seems to deny that particular things, as opposed to Forms, are the proper objects of
knowledge is because they admit compresence of opposites, and so never unqualifiedly exhibit properties
(479). For a more complete discussion of knowlege and opinion, and their objects, as well as analysis of
the provocative (if difficult) analogy of the Divided Line, see Ross (1951, 37-82), Reeve (1988, 52-70),
Annas (1981,190-271).
181 This epistemic requirement, perhaps more clearly exhibited in the earlier dialogues, is widely
recognized: '[The Platonic Socrates] believes that you cannot really be virtuous unless you have a
philosophical understanding of the defmition of virtue' (R. Robinson, 14). Cf. Irwin (1995, 2lff., 235 ff.).
An example from another dialogue is Charmides 158e7-59al0, where Socrates tells Charmides that ifhe
possesses temperance, he will have some awareness of it, and should be able to give an account of it.
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rational part to rule. 18) It is no accident that, once the ideal philosopher is distinguished,
Socrates then claims that such a well-ordered person (ola:xIj1lOC;) could never prove
unjust (486b6-8), and thereafter the philosopher takes the place of the just man in the
argument, up until the point that Glaucon must choose among the perfectly just man
(represented by the philosopher) and various unjust lives, culminating in the completely
unjust man (represented by the tyrant), for the palm of happiness (580c).
So here, finally, is the remainder of Plato's answer to Herodotus' Gyges. Gyges
failed not because of his avarice or pride, but because he erred in his deliberations. He
failed to see that injustice, even in his dire situation, is never preferable to justice, since
whatever bounty he gained through injustice does not equal the lost value ofjustice.
What Gyges lacked was sufficient development of his rational faculties that could have
prophylactically prevented his mistakes. He should have said, with Sophocles'
Neoptolemus, 'I would rather fail in acting nobly, than win in a base manner' (Philoctetes
94-95).
Plato's Predicament
So now, at last, what do we make of the argument, 'after winding a long and
weary way,' as Plato says (484al-2, trans. Shorey)? What are we to make of his defense,
that justice is always more profitable that injustice? Plato ultimately fails. This is
because, despite his efforts to the contrary, he cannot preclude the just person from
182 Kraut (l992a) argues that knowledge of the Forms, the desire for which is innate to the rational part of
the soul, is not merely intellectual but transformative: the philosopher seeks 'to imitate the Forms by
molding human character in their likeness' (328).
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falling into error, and thereby acting unjustly; and yet this error does not always entail a
diminution of happiness. Let us retrace Plato's steps to see how this obtains.
In book four, as we have seen, Plato gives his schematic answer, that internal
harmony is to the soul what health is to the body. Justice, 'doing one's own,' means that
each part of the soul does its own function, under the direction of reason. Moreover,
since Plato's theory is agent-centered, it is not individual acts that matter as much as
stable states of character. Actions, then, are secondary, as reflective of character; single
actions do not overturn a settled disposition: one would not, e.g., consider a criminal a
fine character for one act of charity. Since justice is the dominant good in happiness, the
just person will always be happier than the unjust.
Now Herodotus' Gyges would seem to exhibit ajust character. His appetites and
desires, his sense of honor and self-esteem, all seem to be in proper harmony with his
reason. He recoils at Candaules' command to do wrong, he tries (however impotently) to
dissuade him from the proposed course of action; later, under the queen's dilemma he
again expresses his horror at the thought of committing i~ustice, again tries without
success to tum her purpose; even in his acquiescence, he does not demonstrate any
untoward thirst for power, honor, wealth, or any other misguided ends. In sum, he gives
every indication that he has ajust character. And yet he errs, he makes mistakes in his
moral deliberations that lead him to act unjustly.
But doesn't this injustice, even if cloaked in error, nonetheless make Gyges
unjust, and hence diminish his happiness? On Plato's own account, the answer must be
'no.' As isolated just acts cannot make an unjust person just, so too isolated unjust acts
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cannot make a just person unjust. 183 At least Plato has given us no reason why we should
think that this is the case. Besides, his error was not weakness of will, in the sense of
knowing the best thing to do, but nevertheless doing something else from some
countervailing desire. He simply mistook what was truly in his interest. Plato's view of
character, then, together with his formal description ofjustice, yields that Gyges'
mistakes (even apart from considerations of duress) do not corrupt his essentially just
disposition. If this is so, then Gyges emerges from his difficulties in the best possible
condition: his justice intact (if not entirely unscathed), he unwittingly reaps the rewards
of staggering wealth and power. In this case, as unlikely as it may seem, injustice proves
more profitable than justice.
Plato cannot escape this conclusion by suggesting that by 'justice' and 'injustice,'
he means exclusively those settled states of character, not isolated actions. On this
interpretation, he means that the just character is always better than its unjust
counterpart. But this will not do, since it could lead to the possibility of basically just
agents calculating isolated but extravagant acts of injustice when the rewards are
sufficiently high. But did Gyges not act through error, not calculation? Is this distinction
not relevant? Well, yes-and no: that his unjust action was precipitated by error and not
some resurgent desire clarifies his case such that we can say that he in fact is an
essentially just character; but on his view of character, the source of the isolated actions
of contrary valence is not strictly relevant: in either case they do not themselves overturn
a stable disposition.
183 See n. 154, supra.
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Now I suspect that Plato in fact perceived and was troubled by the possibility of
error causing the just agent to stumble into unjust actions. This is one explanation for the
focus shifting from the just agent to the philosopher, with all the added epistemic
qualifications that the philosopher brings to the argument. Although not strictly required
by his formal account of the just arrangement of the soul, Plato now superimposes the
philosopher's grasp of the Form of justice as part of the requirement for being just. One
must know what justice essentially is in order to be fully just. 184
There are two difficulties with this maneuver. First, very few can claim
knowledge of the Forms. This does not appear to have troubled Plato much, perhaps
because of his pessimistic view of most people's cognitive capabilities. 185 But even apart
from the problems associated with his elitism, it harbors consequences that even he
would not likely embrace. If few can know the Form ofjustice, and so be fully just, then
few can be happy, if justice is indeed the dominant good in happiness. One might think
that Plato would accept this conclusion. But the very terms of Glaucon' s challenge was
universal: Glaucon tasks Socrates with showing-not that for an intellectual elite, that
they are better off if they are just-that anyone, even Gyges, whether the lowly shepherd
of Glaucon's counterfactual or Herodotus' spear-bearer, has reason to be just.
But there is another, more virulent, difficulty with these additional epistemic
qualities. If, as Plato suggests, it is generally true that in order to be truly X one must
have knowledge of the Form X-ness (e.g. to be just one must know what justice
essentially is), then not only does it limit the ranks of the just, it also limits the ranks of
184 See p. 92 and n. ]8], supra.
185 'Philosophy is not possible for the majority' (494a) Cf. Bobonich (2002, 5] -57).
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the unjust. In other words, if this principle holds, then the converse case must also be
true: in order for one to be truly unjust, one must know what injustice essentially is. If
there are such epistemic requirements for injustice, then it would seem that there are far
fewer unjust people roaming the earth that we (and Plato) thought. Plato does not suggest
or imply that Gyges has any such knowledge. Now it might be countered that Plato
considers injustice a kind of ignorance, not knowledge-which is precisely what Socrates
argues to in Republic 1 against Thrasymachus.186 But even apart from the questionable
nature of this argument, later, when Glaucon is laying out his Choice of Lives, the unjust
man is explicitly described as a sort of clever craftsman of injustice, whose skill allows
him to perpetrate the worst injustices while seeming just. 187 So injustice cannot simply
be ignorance.
Therefore, Plato finds himself in a predicament. Not only does Herodotus' Gyges
present a counterexample to his thesis, upsetting his defense, but his own account also
entails consequences that neither he nor his reader would embrace.
186 'So then it seems, I said, that while the just man is wise and good, the unjust man is wicked and
ignorant' (350c4-5).
187 See p. 68, supra.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Now when I had said these things, I supposed that I was done with the discussion, but it
was apparently only a beginning.
(Republic 357al-2)
And so it is for us too, the reader of the Republic. Plato's argument has not quite
convinced us of his thesis, that justice is always more profitable than injustice. And these
questions have preoccupied philosophy ever since. But has Plato, just like
Thrasymachus, left off his argument too soon? What options remain open to Plato, by
which he may salvage his argument? He may alter one of three features of his defense in
order to have the argument come out that justice is always better than injustice: (1) his
account of the essential nature of justice; (2) the role ofjustice as the dominant good in
happiness; (3) his agent-centered ethics. Now I would suggest that, in the end, Plato
would not wish to alter any of these features, as such changes would lead to other
difficulties of equal or greater magnitude. Let us consider these options in turn.
First, Plato could constrict and strengthen his formal account of justice, wherein
each part of the soul 'does its own' under the rational part's direction, by further
narrowing justice so that it depends solely on the rational part. This, however, would
leave a hyper-intellectualized justice that would bear little contact with our commonsense
notion, and so lose its ability to explain our vernacular justice. Without this connection,
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few would find Plato's argument compelling, and would (correctly) believe him to be
defining his terms in such a way as to prejudice the outcome.
Related to this maneuver would be his second option, to strengthen justice from a
dominant, to a sufficient, good with respect to one's happiness. On this view (not unlike
the later Cynics and certain strains of Stoicism), justice (virtue) alone is sufficient to
make one happy. There are two problems with this. First, it seems obviously untrue. It
narrows happiness to such a point that it becomes unrecognizable. It would then fall prey
to Nussbaum's objection, namely, that it would sacrifice much that we think is valuable
in human life and human happiness. Such an austere happiness would be rightly rejected.
Second, if all other goods make no difference as to our happiness, then it would leave us
with no rational basis for choosing alternatives that are equally consistent with justice.
Since happiness is the final end toward which all our decisions ultimately incline, if
justice is the only relevant factor to that end, then it leaves most of our choices and
actions without any justification whatsoever (Vlastos 1991, 128-29). This would
preclude making sense of one's life as a whole; as such, Plato would eschew this
maneuver.
Finally, he might choose to abandon his agent-centered ethics in favor of an act-
centered theory, whereby individual actions carry far more weight, so that Herodotus'
Gyges' injustice cannot count as a counter-example. But then his entire critique of the
traditional (performative) notion ofjustice collapses. Motives would then be subsumed
to action, and there would be only weak grounds for not following in Gyges' footsteps. In
short, none of these alternatives would be appealing to Plato, and for good reason.
If Plato's defense has failed, then, what has he accomplished? Even if Plato
cannot maintain that justice is always more profitable than injustice, he has shown
convincingly how internal dissonance can frustrate our happiness. It is commonly
recognized that neither wealth, nor power, nor pleasure, nor any of a number of other
goods, are in themselves sufficient for happiness. Plato has helped us understand why
that is so, and provides a motive to rethink our desires and actions. He has, in sum,
provided a defense of the examined life.
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